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ABSTRACT: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND
MACROECONOMICS
,
The essays contained in this dissertation are described below.
Essay #1: "INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION: Policy
Analysis in a Staggered Wage-setting Model
The economies of the major industrialized"nations have become
integ rated in many ways, and yet, important structural asymmetries remain
between these economies. This paper focuses 9n one such asymmetry, that of
differing wage contracting institutions, and examines the issues of policy
coordination and economic interdepedence among such nations within this
framework. A two-country model is employed with forward-looking agents who
form contracts based on the expected future evolution of price and output.
Multi-period dynamic games are played between the policymakers, where both
cooperative and noncooperative equilibria are derived for the simulation
experiments.
Essay #2: "TESTS FOR LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS: A Critique"
Much empirical work has been devoted to estimating the proportion of liquidity
constrained consumers (P) and the fraction of income held by these liquidity
constrained consumers (L). A common feature of these studies is that P and L
are taken to be constant over time. This paper attempts to determine whether
this assertion is empirically justified. Using panel data, we find that P and L do
vary over time with trend and cyclical components. Hence, this study shows that
it is incorrect to estimate P and L as fixed parameters over time, and that P and
L should instead be treated endogenously.
Essay #3: "LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT VOLATILITY: Evidence fronl Post-War
U.S. Aggregate Time-Series Data
The "Life Cycle - Permanent Income Hypothesis" posits the existence of a
consumer who chooses a consumption level in each period so as to maximize
expected lifetime utility. Credit markets are assumed to be perfect so that the
consumer may lend and borrow freely. In the absence of such credit markets,
consumers may find themselves unable to satisfy their desired consumption,
plans, and so, are said to be "liquidity constrained". Using post-war U.S.
aggregate time-series data, the importance, and persistence of such credit
market constraints are examined.
INTRODUCTION
The following three essays address two issues that have gained much
recent attention among macroeconomists. The first essay - "International
Policy Coordination: Policy Analysis in a Staggered Wage-setting Model" - deals
with the incentives for countries to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies in an .
environment where the countries differ only in the length of the labor contracts
which typify their respective economies. The second essay - "Tests for Liquidity
Constraints: A Critique" and the third essay - "Liquidity Constraint Volatility:
Evidence from Post-war Aggregate Time-series Data" - are tests of the
importance and persistence of liquidity constraints in determining consumption
behavior in the United States using micro-based data and aggregate time-
series data, respectively. Moreover, the latter two essays improve upon the
existing literature on liquidity constrained consumption behavior by showing that
the degree of these liquidity constraints does vary significantly over time, and
so, should be treated endogenously.
The motivation for Essay One comes from the casual observation that the
world economy has become more integrated, especially in trade and capital
markets, since World War II. It has always been the case over this period that
other economies have been significantly affected by economic developments in
the United States. In addition, foreign economies have had an increasing role in
the economy of the United States, as evidenced by the increasing share of
imports and exports in relation to GNP in the United States. In particular,
shares of exports as a percentage of GNP have risen from 4.3 in 1950 to 7.0 in
1985, while the shares of imports have risen from 4.1 °10 in 1950 to 10.0°10 in
1985. This pattern is also shared by the industrialized nations of Europe (such
as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) and in Japan. In Germany, for
example, exports as a percentage share of GNP have increased from 11.4 in
1950 to 35.2 in 1985, and imports as a percentage share of GNP have
increased from 12.7 in 1950 to 31.3 in 1985. The data unambiguously point to
an increased interdependence of the economies of the industrialized world.
This evolution in the world economy has held out the promise of Pareto
superior welfare gains to countries through the coordination of their
macroeconomic policy decisions. As defined by Wallich [1984], coordination
"implies a significant modification of national policies in recognition of
international economic interdependence". The increased economic
interdependence of national economies requires that policymakers recognize
the effects that thei r policy decisions have on the economies of other nations.
Economic theory, in general, supports the notion that Pareto superior welfare
outcomes for autonomous nations can be reached through the coordination of
monetary and fiscal policies1, and yet one finds few examples of true policy
coordination. As Fischer [1987] points out, "oo. macroeconomic policy
coordination among the major blocs is unlikely to advance beyond the provision
of mutual information and occasional agreements for specific policy tradeoffs".
Given the apparent absence of explicit policy coordination, it is natural to search
for reasons. It is clear that any complete answer involves the political and
social, as well as economic characteristics which define these nations. This
essay addresses the question by looking at the differences in the very
structures of the national economies, most notably, differences in the
institutional arrangements of their labor markets.
Although national economies have become integrated and more
interdependent in many ways, there remain important structural asymmetries
1See Rogoff [1985] and Kehoe [1986] for counter-examples to this principle.
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between these economies. One of these asymmetries is the length and
staggered nature of the labor contracts which characterize the respective
economies. Labor contracts in the United States are generally longer and are
renegotiated in a more disaggregated manner (Le., are more staggered) than
in Europe and Japan. These labor market asymmetries have important
implications for the views of policymakers regarding the effectiveness of their
monetary and fiscal policy decisions. When confronted by adverse economic
conditions, different perspectives about policy performance can increase the
difficulties of reaching a concensus about the proper policy actions to be taken,
and so, complicate their coordination.
Essays Two and Three arise from a common theoretical foundation
based on tests for liquidity constrained consumption behavior in the United
States.2 The Life Cycle - Permanent Income Hypothesis (LC-PIH) assumes the
existence of individuals who are able to lend and borrow freely against expected
future income (Le., the existence of perfect capital markets} in order to smooth
consumption over their lifetime. If individuals are unable to borrow during
periods of their lives when income is temporarily low, and so are unable to
satisfy their desired consumption plans, they are said to be "liquidity
constrained". These credit market impeMections are then the source of liquidity
constrained consumption behavior. All previous studies on the presence of
liquidity constraints on consumption behavior have treated the estimates of its
importance and persistence as being constant over the sample period.
Economic theory, however, suggests that the degree of liquidity constraints
varies over time. That is, the extent of liquidity constrained consumption
2 See Hall [1987] for an overview of the work done on liquidity constrained consumption
behavior.
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behavior is a function of contemporaneous demographic, credit market, and
other economic characteristics. Hence, it should be treated as endogenous.
This result is empirically verified in the second essay using a combination of
panel data sets - the Survey of Consumer Finance and the Panel Study on
Income Dynamics, and in the third essay using aggregate time-series data for
the United States. Two measures of the severity of liquidity constrained
consumption behavior are used - (i) the proportion of the total population that
are liquidity constrained and (ii) the fraction of total income held by liquidity
constrained consumers. Both of these measures are used in the second essay,
while only the latter is estimated in the third essay. As noted below, it is the
latter which is of greater interest to policymakers.
In the second essay, employing a logit estimation technique developed by
Jappelli [1987], simulations are performed to derive separate estimates of the
fraction of consumers who are liquidity constrained in the years from 1968 to
1982. It is found that these estimated proportions do vary significantly over the
sample period. From these estimated fractions of liquidity constrained
consumers, approximate estimates are derived for the proportion of total
income held by liquidity constrained consumers. It is the latter which is of
greatest importance to policymaker, for it is these estimates that have direct
application to questions such as the effectiveness tax reform and income
redistribution schemes. The second essay is also novel in its use of two
separate panel data sets to address the issue of the severity of liquidity
constrained consumption behavior.
The third essay employs the insights gained from the second essay by
estimating the movement in the fraction of income held by liquidity constrained
consumers over the period from 1954 to 1985 using aggregate time-series
data. These estimates can be obtained more directly when the estimation is
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performed using aggregate time-series data. Rather than performing
simulations, as was done ~ith the panel data sets in the second essay, the use of
aggregate time-series data allows for the estimation of the movement in the
fraction of income held by liquidity constrained consumers using
contemporaneous economic, demographic, and credit market variables. As in
the second essay, the severity of liquidity constrained consumption behavior
does vary significantly over the sample period, and is consistent with the
general macroeconomic and credit market developments in the United States
over the sample period.
As mentioned above, the second and third essays share a common
theoretical base. They differ in the empirical methodology employed, but they
reach the same conclusion. Future work in this area must acknowledge the fact
that the fraction of income held by liquidity constrained consumers should be
treated as endogenous.
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION:
Policy Analysis in a Staggered Wage-Setting Model
Abstract
The economies of the major industrialized nations have become integrated in
many ways, and yet, important structural asymmetries remain between these
economies. This paper focuses on one such asymmetry, that of differing wage
contracting institutions, and examines the issues of policy coordination and
economic interdepedence among such nations within this framework. A two-
country model is employed with forward-looking agents who form contracts
based on the expected future evolution of price and output. Multi-period
dynamic games are played between the policymakers, where both cooperative
and noncooperative equilibria are derived for the simulation experiments.
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
The issues of policy coordination and interdependence among nations
have been the focus of much recent theoretical and empirical work. Prolonged
episodes of stagnation due to adverse economic shocks and the increasing
importance of foreign economies on domestic economic activity have provided
strong incentives for such research. The hope has been that concerted action
among nations may yield a greater degree of prosperity for all, and yet one
finds relatively few instances of policy coordination. Although many forces are
at work in the making of policy, such as the unwillingness to relinquish autonomy
in policy formation, it is important to look at the economic incentives which
nations have to form policy cooperatively.
Serious discussion on the issues of policy coordination must first address
the nature of the interdependence with which autonomous nations are
confronted. That is, one must consider the economic framework within which
policy-making is formulated. Although the economies of the major industrialized
nations have increasingly become more integrated, especially in capital
markets, there remain significant institutional differences. In particular, one
area where there are significant differences between economies is in "wage
contracting profiles", i.e., the terms on which wage contracts are formed.
Sachs [1979] has shown that significant institutional differences exist
between the United States and the non-North American OECD countries in
terms of contract lengths and the staggered nature of contracts. The United
States' unionized labor markets are typified by overlapping, long-term wage
agreements which are only partially indexed; while Europe and Japan are
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characterized by some combination of short-term contracts, high indexation, or
centralized bargaining.1 It is these wage-setting institutional differences that
have led to differing views about the performance of macroeconomic policy.
The greater nominal wage rigidity apparent in the United States has supported
the view of a strong link between monetary policy and output among policy-
makers, while European and Japanese policy-makers view monetary expansion
as primarily feeding inflation. These differing attitudes explain the controversy
that existed in the mid-1970's between the United States, Europe and Japan
regarding the proper monetary stance in the face of persistent stagflation. This
experience of the 1970's and 80's serves to motivate the questions addressed in
this paper.
Structural asymmetries can have important effects on the strategic
behavior of policy-makers by influencing the economic environment in which
policies are formulated. The manner in which monetary and/or fiscal policies of
one country affect other countries determines, to a large extent, the optimal
policy choice of a country in a strategic setting. This position is supported by
Canzoneri and Gray [1983] who posit that the appropriate policy responses for
interdependent economies depend on knowing the type of policy regime faced.
They consider the (i) "locomotive" case in which a monetary expansion by either
country has an expansionary output effect in the other country, (ii) the "beggar-
thy-neighbor" case in which a monetary expansion in either country has a
contractionary output effect in the other country, and (iii) the "asymmetric" case
in which monetary expansions have differing qualitative
1 .
In general, European and Japanese labor contracts are renewed annually; whereas over
70°1'0 of the major contract settlements in the United States covered 3 years or more, and less
than 20/0 had settlements of 1 year or less [Sachs (1979) ].
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(contractionary/expansionary) output effects.
This paper focuses on one particular type of structural asymmetry, that
of differing "wage contracting profiles" across countries. The staggered wage-
setting structure is "forward-looking" and is similar in spirit to that developed by
Calvo [1983]. Wage-setters are assumed to set nominal wages according to
the future expected price and output levels over the length of the contract. This
is consistent with the Phelps-Taylor staggered contracting approach in that
"new" contracts are based upon rational forecasts of the future path of all
relevant variables. The forward-looking nature of the wage-setting institutions
is important, since this implies that all future demand management policies over
the contract are internalized in the current wage level. In a stylized fashion
differences in "wage contracting profiles" are introduced via varying contract
lengths. Parametric symmetry is otherwise assumed to hold.
The differing nominal rigidities due to asymmetric contract lengths
requires that alternative policies be analyzed within a dynamic framework.
Although much of the existing literature on policy coordination employs static
models in which the policy games are studied, the present paper cannot follow
this approach because of the inherently dynamic nature of wage contracting.
As a result, policy-makers must not only consider the steady-state effects of a
particular policy choice, but also the tradeoffs that exist as the economy adjusts
toward a new steady-state. Hence, a dynamic game is better suited to deal with
the issues that are central to this paper. Within the given structure, incentives
to behave cooperatively versus noncooperative behavior are analyzed. Nash
and Stackelberg solutions are the noncooperative equilibria to be considered,
while the Nash "bargaining solution" is the cooperative equilibrium to be
considered.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model in
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detail, including the wage-setting structure that is assumed to exist. Section 3
contains the theoretical de.rivation of the noncooperative and cooperative
equilibria to be considered in this paper. Section 4 discusses the game-
theoretic simulation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with a brief
summary of the main results.
SECTION 2: MODEL
A dynamic, two-country, flexible exchange rate, rational expectations
model is used. The demand side is explicitly modeled. Supply of the good in
each country is assumed to respond sluggishly to excess demand, where each
country produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for the good of the other
country. Each country is assumed to face two types of stochastic "white noise"
shocks: aggregate demand shocks and labor market - supply side shocks. A
staggered wage-setting component is included where prices are sticky in the
short-run, and where the wage-setting behavior is an important parametric
asymmetry between countries. Supply side conditions are not modelled
explicitly, but are implicitly characterized by the nominal wage rate of each
country and by the adjustment of output to excess demand. Government
financing issues are ignored, as are issues dealing with productivity growth
over the period under consideration. Regarding the latter, this may be justified
by arguing that the horizens of policy-makers are relatively short. The formal
model is log-linear expressed as deviations from steady state, where '*' denotes
the foreign country.
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HOME COUNTRY
( 1) Yt+1 - Yt = '1'1 [EDt - Yu
where
EDt = d1 Y*t - d2 [it - ( (Pt+1)£ - Pt )]
+ da Qt + 9t + v1t
( 2) Wt+1 = (1+y) Wt - 'Y (Pt + Yt)
- (1+y) V2t
( 3 ) Pt+1 - Pt = '1'2 (Pit - Pt)
FOREIGN COUNTRY
Y*t+1 - Y*t = '1'*1 [EO*t - Y*u
where
EO*t = d1 * Yt - d2* [i*t - ( (P*t+1)£ - P*t )]
d * * *
- a qt + 9 t + V1 t
W*t+1 = (1 +1') w*t - 1* (P*t + Y*t)
- (1 +y*) V2*t
* * *( * *)P t+1 - P t = '1'2 Pi t - P t
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( 6 )
( 7 ) Qt = P*t + 9t - Pt
Definition of Variables:
y,y*: real output ;
w,w*: nominal wage rate;
p,p*: general price index;
Pi,Pi*: long-run price level;
i, i*: nominal interest rate;
e: nominal exchange rate expressed in terms of the
number of units of domestic currency per unit of
foriegn currency;
q: real exchange rate expressed as units of domestic
goods per unit of the foreign good;
v1,v1 *,v2,v2*: "white noise" disturbances.
Equations (1) are the domestic and foreign goods market equilibrium
conditions where supply is assumed to adjust to excess demand at rate '111 over
time. Aggregate demand in each country is assumed to depend positively on the
level of real output in the other country and on its relative competitive advantage
(where the Marshall-Lerner condition is assumed to hold), while depending
negatively on the real interest rate. As noted by Blanchard [1986], such a
situation is plausible if there is some monopoly power in both goods and labor
markets. That is, for output to be determined by the level of aggregate demand,
one must start from an equilibrium in which price exceeds marginal cost and the
wage exceeds the marginal utility of labor.
Equations (2) characterize the movement of nominal wages in the
domestic and foreign countries over time. The derivation of (2) is as follows.
For each country, it is assumed that contract lengths are stochastic and are
independent and identically distributed across contracts. If a contract is in effect
at time t, the probability that the contract will last over the next period is given
by:
6
(8) P[nol renegotiated] =1~ •1> o.
Similarly, the probability that a contract is renegotiated in the next period is:
(9 ) P[renegotiated] =t:y. 1> o.
Therefore, if a contract is in effect at time t, the probability that the contract will
not be renegotiated for s more periods is:
( 10 ) P[s, yJ = (1 ~ 'Y)(1 : 'Y)S
Contract lengths in the economy as a whole are then assumed to be formed
according to a geometric distribution and is similar to the continuous-time
version presented by Calvo [1983]. The parameters Y(1) neatly characterize
the "wage contracting profiles" of the respective countries. Consider the limiting
cases:
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lim P (not renegotiated) = lim [1/(1+)')] = 1
~o ~o
lim P (renegotiated) = lim [y/(1+y)] = 0
~o 1-+0
lim P(not renegotiated) = lim [1/(1 +y)) = 0
1-+00 1-+00
lim P(renegotiated) = lim [y/(1+y)] = 1
1-+00 y-+oo
Therefore, the smaller (larger) is y , the greater (smaller) is the probability that
the contract is not renegotiated which implies a longer (shorter) contract length.
Assuming homogeneous wage-setting institutions within an individual country
who form (the log of) wages rationally taking into account prices and excess
demand during the length of the contract yields:
where P~i=Pt+i and Y:+i =Yt+i under the rational expectations assumption.
From (11) one is able to derive equations (2).2 Equations (2) can be rewritten
2 Equations (2) are derived from equation (11) in the following manner:
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as:
Wt+1 - Wt = 1 [ Wt - Pt - Yt] - (1 +1) v2t
This form looks strikingly similar to a model in which 1 represents an indexing
parameter. This is intuitively appealing since shorter contract lengths (Le.,
larger values for 1) mean that contracts are negotiated more frequently, and so,
is consistent with the indexing interpretation. In addition, larger (smaller) values
for 1 imply lesser (greater) degree of staggered wage-setting.
Equations (3) and (4) have the general price indices adjusting sluggishly
toward a weighted average of domestic and foreign wage costs, where d1(d1*)
represent the degree of openness in each country. Beyond the obvious
interpretation that residents of one country import goods from the other
country, this is also plausible in the presence of a mark-up pricing scheme
along with imported intermediate imports. Equations (3) directly account for the
effects that nominal wage rates (and so, unit costs of production) have on a
country's price level in an open economy setting. The degree of openness of a
9
Wt =
(~)
1_(_1)L-1
1+1
(Pt + yt} + V2 t
-1 -1[ (1 + y) - L ] Wt = 1 (Pt + Yt) + [(1 + y) - L ] v2 t
where L is a lag operator and the transversality condition is assumed to hold. Since Et (Wt+1) =
Wt+1 (by the rational expectations assumption) and Et (v2, t+1) =0 (since it is a "white noise"
disturbance), we have equations (2).
country then determines how exposed that country is to the wage-setting
behaviors in the other country. Equations (3) and (4) posit that the general
price index in each country adjusts sluggishly to the weighted average of
domestic and foreign country unit costs, expressed in units of the country's own
currency.
Equations (5) are the money market equilibrium conditions where money
demand is negatively related to the interest rate and positively related to the
level of real output. It is assumed that residents of one country do not hold the
currency of the other country. Equation (6) characterizes the asset market
equilibrium condition under perfect capital mobility. Hence, the exchange rate is
determined in asset markets under conditions of perfect capital mobility. Finally,
Equation (7) defines the real exchange rate in terms of units of the domestic
good per unit of the foreign good.
This model differs from many others in that domestic and foreign wages
(w, w*), as well as the nominal exchange rate (e) are nonpredetermined
variables which can make discrete jumps in response to "news". This feature
leads to important differences in the dynamics of the model as compared to
those in which wages are predetermined. With "forward-looking" labor
contracts, current and future policy choices are immediately reflected in
nominal wages. Longer contract lengths (smaller values of y) imply that future
monetary and/or fiscal policies are more fully internalized in the current
nominal wage demands as compared to contracts formed over shorter periods.
Hence, policy-makers in countries with longer contract lengths must, to a
greater degree, pay "now" for future policy choices. Finally, domestic and
foreign prices (p, p*) and domestic and foreign output (y, y*) are the
predetermined variables of the system.
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SECTION 3: DYNAMIC GAMES: The Theoretical Derivations
In the formulation of policy, policymakers understand that their choices
influence the evolution over time of the variables to which they attach
importance. Likewise, policymakers realize that they are not the only player in
this game. Attention must be paid to the spillover effects generated by the policy
decisions of other autonomous nations. Hence, policy choices for a country are
essentially welfare-optimizing strategic decisions made in an environment in
which other autonomous decision-makers are also formulating policy. A
dynamic game-theoretic model is therefore the best framework in which to
investigate the strategic policy-making of autonomous nations. Both cooperative
and noncooperative equilibria are considered. The Nash "bargaining solution"
is the particular cooperative equilibrium concept to be considered, while the
Nash and Stackelberg solutions are the noncooperative equilibria to be
considered.
One observes few occurrences of true cooperative behavior among
nations. For example, one notices some degree of policy coordination among
nations with some geographic proximity to one another, such as the EEC. In
contrast, noncooperative ("competitive") policy-making is the standard "modus
operandi" between nations. This is an interesting phenomenon in light of the fact
that cooperative solutions are generally Pareto superior to noncooperative
solutions.3 That is, one player (country) may experience a welfare improvement
without decreasing the welfare of any other player by adopting a cooperative
3 Rogoff [1983] analyzes cases in which monetary cooperation between two governments is not
Pareto superior to fully-discretionary noncooperative monetary policy.
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solution.
Many reasons exist for the failure of nations to form policy cooperatively.
A confluence of politico-economic factors have been identified as reasons for
this failure. For example, casual observation points to a reluctance of
policymakers to relinquish their policy-making autonomy. As noted by Hughes-
Hallett [1984], other important considerations include:
i) the gains from cooperation may be insignificant in comparison to the
losses in meeting national goals;
ii) cooperative policy-making may redistribute the relative benefits
among the nations such that the country which secures the greater benefits in
the noncooperative case may not yield as large an improvement in the
cooperative case;
(iii) incentives to cheat may exist in the cooperative case such that the
welfare loss to the country which maintains its part of the bargain may be too
large so that a cooperative agreement is never initiated.
This paper attempts to gain some insight into these disincentives to policy
coordination, as well as to investigate the nature of the equilibrium policy
feedback rules.
The dynamic games are played over a finite horizon of T periods.
Domestic policymakers choose a sequence of policies
u ={ u1' u2'···' uT-1}
which minimize their undiscounted quadratic loss function subject to the
evolution of the state variables over the T periods of the game:
12
T
Min E(W) = L xl' KXt
1=1
subject to Xt = A Xt-1 + C Ut-1 + C* U*t-1 + F Vt-1
Due to the dynamic structure of the model, policymakers make their policy
choices at time t-1 to minimize the quadratic loss function for time 1. Put simply,
there is a one period lag between the policy choice and its resulting effect upon
social welfare. Hence, for the T period game, the policymaker chooses a
sequence of T-1 policies. !he realized value of the quadratic loss function in the
initial period is determined by the assumed initial conditions of the system.
Similarly, the foreign country policy makers choose a sequence of policies
u* ={U1*' U2*' ..., ur-1*}
to minimize foreign quadratic losses:
T
Min E(W*) = L xl' K* Xl
t=1
subject to Xt = A Xt-1 + C Ut-1 + C* U*t-1 + F Vt-1
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where
X' = [y y* p p* w w* e] is the state vector;
u' = [g m] is the vector of domestic instruments;
u*' = [g* m*] is the vector of foreign instruments;
v' = [V1 V2 V*1 V*2] is a vector of domestic and foreign shocks;
A7x7 matrix, C7x2 matrix, C*7x2 matrix, F7x4 matrix;
K7x7 and K*7x7 are non-negative definite symmetric matrices.
The constraint for each policymaker's optimizatioon problem defines a
first-order discrete time system in which only the first lag of each endogenous
variable, policy variable and random shock influences the current value of each
endogenous variable. Equations (1) through (7) can be rewritten to yield the
above matrix form for the constraint, which is identical for each policymaker.
The A matrix captures the effect of last period's state variables on the level of
the current state variables, Le., it expresses the internal evolution of the state
variables over time. The C (C*) matrix captures the effects of last period's
domestic (foreign) policy choices on the current level of the state variables. The
F matrix embodies the effects of last periods stochastic shocks upon the current
level of the state variables.
The domestic policymaker attempts to minimize the deviations of domestic
output and domestic price level from their trend values by the appropriate
choice of domestic policy instruments, while the foreign policymaker chooses
policy so as to minimize the deviations of foreign output and foreign price level
from trend. The K and K* matrices are essentially the "weighting matrices" for
the domestic and foreign countries which identify the state variables which are
of importance to the respective policymaker.
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In this paper,
K - P 0 0 0 000 K* - 000 0 000
o 0 0 000 0 o P* 0 0 000
o 0 1-{3 000 0 000 0 000
o 0 0 000 0 000 1-{3* 0 0 0
o 0 0 o 0 0 0 000 0 000
o 0 0 000 0 000 0 000
o 0 0 000 0 000 0 000
where 0 s; ~,~* s; 1.
The weights ~ (~*) are assigned to the domestic (foreign) output deviations, and
1-P (1-~*) are assigned to the domestic (foreign) general price level deviations.
Dynamic programming is used to solve this finite horizon constrained
minimization problem. The solution is recursive in that the final period
optimization problem is first solved, and then by a process of backward
recursion one is able to solve for all periods of the problem. The advantage, as
noted by many authors, is that the multi-period optimization problem is reduced
to a series of one-period optimization problems. Having solved for the optimal
policy rules in the final period, one moves back to the second-to-Iast period and
solves the optimization for that period, conditional upon the policy moves made
in the last period. Hence, in each period, the current period's optimization
problem is solved, taking into account the optimal policy rules made for all future
periods of the game.
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A. Feedback Nash Equilibrium
Under the feedback Nash equilibrium, the policymaker in each country, in
deriving his own policy rule, assumes that the other country's policy rule is
invariant to changes in his own policy choices, i.e., the domestic policymaker
believes that [~~] =0 and the foreign policymaker believes [:~.] =O.
In their general form, the Nash equilibrium results are symmetric in the
sense that the foreign country results may be obtained from the domestic
country results simply by inserting the foreign country matrices for their
domestic analogs. Hence, only the domestic country equations are formally
derived here. The recursive solution for any period T-i is given below. See
Appendix A for the formal derivation of the general recursive forms.
Period T-i:
Solving backward over the T-1 periods in which the optimal policy rules
are formed, one can determine a recursive solution for any period T-i, i =
1,... ,T. In period T-i, the domestic policymaker minimizes the period (T-i+1)
quadratic loss function:
Min VT-i+1 = X'T-i+1 K XT-i+1 + ET-i (VT-i+2)
{Ut-i}
subject to XT-i+1 = A XT-i + C UT-i + C* U*T-i + F VT-i
where
since Er-i (VT-i+1) = 0; and where VT-i+2 is the "cost-to-go" term which
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represents the optimized value of the social welfare functions from period T-i+2
to period T. D and Q are defined below.
By substitution, the optimization problem can be rewritten as:
17
Min
{UT-i}
N[A Xt-i + C UT-i + C* U*T-i + F VT-i]' D T-i [A Xt-i + C UT-i + C* U*T-i + F VT-i]
N N INN
where D T-i = K + AI [Q T-i+1 D T-i+1 Q T-i+1]
The resulting first-order condition ( a~T-~1 = 0 ) yields the domestic country
uT-1
reaction function:
N
UT-i = - G T-i [A XT-i + F VT-i + C* U*T-i]
where G~_i = [CI DNT_i C ] -1 CI DNT_i
The corresponding foreign country reaction function is:
U*T-i = - G.NT-i [A XT-i + F VT-i + C UT-i]
where G*N. = [C*' D*N . C*] -1 C*I D*N .T-I T-I T-I
D*NT_i = K* + AI [Q'T-i+1 D*~_i+1 OT-i+1 ] A
The domestic and foreign Nash equilibrium feedback policy rules are:
N N
UT-i = - ( R T-i ) -1 S T-i [A XT-i + F vT-il
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where
and
R~-i = I - {[ GNT_i C*] [G*N,.-i C) }
SNT . = G
N
T . [I - C* G*NT . ]-I -I -I
*. (R*N) -1 S*N [ A . F . ]U T-I = - T-i T-i XT-I + VT-I
S*Nr . = G*Nr . [I - C G
N
T . ]-I -I -I
The Nash equilibrium values of the period T-i objective functions are then:
- N 'N N
VT-i+1 = (A XT-i + F VT-i )' [ n T-i D T-i n T-i ] ( A XT-i + F VT-i )
where nNT_i = I - C ( R
N
T_i ) -1 SNT_i - C* ( R*~_i ) -1 S*N,.-i
B. Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium
Unlike the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg solution introduces
differences in the way that each player accounts for the other player's policy
reaction. Under the Nash game they were identical, Le., each assumed that the
other player did not react at all. The Stackelberg game posits two types of
players: a "leader" and a "follower". The Stackelberg equilibrium has much to
offer in terms of its real world relevance. In the absence of overt cooperation,
the assumption that smaller countries form policy, to some degree, in response
to policy moves by more dominant players is frequently observed. Here we
assume that the foreign country is the "follower" and the domestic country is the
"leader". The "follower" forms his conjectures about the "leader's" policy
reaction to his own policy moves as in the Nash game, i.e., (oujou*)=o.
However, the "leader" internalizes the "follower's" policy reaction function into
the derivation of his own optimal policy rule. Hence, the "leader's" optimal policy
rule is a function of the current state variables (x), the current disturbances (v),
and the policy reaction function of the "follower":
The Stackelberg equilibrium implies that within the intertemporal dynamics of
the game considered here, there exists a "Ieader"-"follower" sequence of
actions within each particular period. Consequently, the general form of the
optimal feedback rules under the Stackelberg game are not symmetric as in the
Nash game.
Again a solution for the Stackelberg equilibrium is derived via a process of
backward recursion beginning with the final period. This is done formally in
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Appendix A. From this one can determine the general form of the solution for
any period T-i.
Period T-i
The foreign country's ("follower's") optimization problem in period T-i is
identical to its Nash problem. Hence, the follower's reaction function is:
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( 12 )
where
S
U*T-i = - G* T-i [AXT-i + F VT-i + C UT-i]
G*S . = [C*' O*S . C* ] -1 C*' O*S .T-I T-I T-I
o*S . = K* + A' [ n*S '. o*S. n*S' ] A
T-I T-I+1 T-t+1 T-i+1
Now consider the domestic country's ("leader's") optimization problem in period
T-i:
Min VT-i+1 = X'T-i+1 K xT-i+1 + ET-i (VT-i+2)
{UT-i}
subject to XT-i+1 = A XT-i + C UT-i + C* U*T-i + F VT-i
and equation ( 12 ).
Substituting the constraints as well as the foreign country's reaction function into
the domestic objective function, the optimization problem becomes:
{UT-i} [A XT-i + F VT-i + C UT-i]
s ,S' S S
where D T-i = K + A [n T-i+1 D T-i+1 n T-i+1 ] A.
In its general form the first-order condition is:
The optimal policy rule for the Stackelberg "leader" is then:
S S
UT-i = - ( R T-i C ) -1 R T-i [A XT-i + F vT-il
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where RS . = C' [I - C* G*S .]' DS . [I - C* G*S .]T-I T-I T-I T-I
Substituting the "leader's" optimal policy rule into the "follower's" reaction
function, the "follower's" optimal policy rule is:
where
The optimized period T-i domestic and foreign objective functions are then:
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where
where n*ST . = [I - C (RS . C) -1 RS . - C* S*S .]
-I T-I T-I T-I
C. Cooperative Frontier
Under the cooperative game, domestic and foreign policymakers
coordinate their policy choices so as to minimize a single quadratic loss function
which is a weighted average (0 S; a S; 1) of their individual quadratic loss
functions. The scalar "a" denotes the relative weight given the domestic
objective as compared to the foreign objective in the cooperative policy problem.
Given a convex opportunity set, the choice of the parameter "a" will isolate a
unique point on the cooperative frontier which bounds the opportunity set. In
general, the advantage, from a welfare standpoint, of cooperative policymaking
is that policy tradeoffs are permitted here (in contrast to noncooperative
games) which may increase the welfare of one (or both) countries, with no
country being worse off. This is one explanation for the standard result that
such cooperative solutions are generally Pareto superior to noncooperative
solutions. And yet, as mentioned above, there may exist disincenti_ves which
inhibit a particular country from engaging in cooperative policymaking.
Again, the general form cooperative problem is presented here for any
period T-i. The more formal derivation is performed in Appendix A.
Period T-i
The single constrained minimization problem for period T-i can be initially
expressed as:
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Min VT-i+1 = X'T-i+1 [a K] XT-i+1 + X'T-i+1 [(1-a) K] XT-i+1 + ET-i (VT-i+2)
{UT-i, U*T-il
subject to XT-i+1 = AXT-i + C UT-i + C* U*T-i + F VT-i
C 'C *C C
ET-i (VT-i+2) = X'T-i+1 A' [n T-i+1 ( a 0 T-i+1 + (1-a) 0 T-i+1) n T-i+1 ] A XT-i+1
By substitution of the the constraints into the objective function and redefining
terms, this can be rewritten as:
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Min
{UT-j, U*T-il
where
[A XT-i + C UT-i + C* U*T-i + F VT-i]' HT-i
[A XT-i + C UT-i + C* U*T-i + F VT-i]
HT-i = [a DCT_i + (1-a) D*~_i]
C ,C' C C
o T-i = K + A [n T-i+1 0 T-i+1 n T-i+1 ] A
The first-order conditions with respect to uT-i and U*T-i are:
C
UT-i = - G T-i [A XT-i + F Vt-i + C* u*T-il
where G~_i = [C' HT-i C] -1 C' HT-i
where G*;-i = [C*' HT-i C* ]-1 C*' HT-i
The domestic and foreign policy reaction functions may be solved simultaneously
to reveal the domestic and foreign optimal policy rules for period T-i:
C C
UT-i = - (R T-i ) -1 S T-i [ A xl-i + F vT-il
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where
where
R;_i = I - [GCT_i C*] [G*CT_i C]
SCT . = GCT . [1- C* G*CT .]-I -I -I
* . - (R*C ) -1 s*C [ A . F . ]U T-I - - T-i T-i XT-I + VT-I
s*CT . = G*CT . [I-CG
C
T ·]-I -I -I
The optimized objective function is then obtained by substituting the domestic and
foreign optimal policy rules into the original objective function. which yields:
Since HT-i =aDT-i + (1-a)D*T-i , the minimized levels of the domestic and foreign
quadratic loss functions can be identified from the above equation:
- C ICC
Vd,T-i+1 = (A XT-i + F VT-i)' [n T_i (ex D T-i ) n T-i) (A XT-i + F VT-i )
D. Nash fixed threat bargaining model 4
Two-player cooperative games are considered here. Cooperative
games differ from noncooperative games in that the former allow for binding
agreements. The particular cooperative agreement employed in this paper is
'the Nash fixed threat bargaining model [Nash(1950)). The focus of this section
will be to outline the fundamental aspects of this cooperative game.
Denote H c 9t2 as the set of feasible payoff pairs for each player and de
H as the "threat point". If u =(U1 ,U2) E H, then there exist (joint) actions available
to the players that result in the payoff u. Otherwise, in the absense of
coordinated action, d =(d1,d2) is the resulting payoff. No scope for further
arbitration is assumed to exist. The pair r =(H,d) is defined to be a two-player
4 See James W. Friedman [1986].
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fixed threat bargaining game if H c 9{2 is compact and convex, d E H, and H
contains at least one element, u, such that u » d. Two other definitions are
necessary. The set of two-player fixed threat bargaining games is denoted W.
Finally, a solution to (H,d) E W is a function f(H,d) that associates a unique
element of H with the game (H,d) E W, where f(H,d) =(f1(H,d), f2(H,d) ).
The conditions defining the Nash solution for this game are:
(i) individual rationality: the solution payoff to each player should yield a
welfare level at least as large as the player would receive if no agreement were
reached;
(ii) invariance to positive affine utility transformations;
(iii) symmetry: if the feasible set H is symmetric about a 45° line.through
the origin and d1 =d2, then f1(H,d) =f2(H,d);
(iv) independence of irrelevant alternatives: if (H ,d), (H',d') E W, d =d',
H c H', and f(H',d') E H, then f(H,d) =f(H',d').
Conditions (i) through (iv) imply that f(H,d) is Pareto optimal.
The Nash "bargaining" solution is that element H which maximizes the
product ("Nash prOduct") of gains from agreement. Recalling that policymakers
attempt to minimize a quadratic loss function in order to maximize welfare, the
problem becomes one of maximizing:
(d1 - L1) * (d2 - L2)
where Li is the quadratic loss value for the ith player (i =1,2). Figure 1
illustrates the general case for the Nash "bargaining" problem.
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Figure 1
The frontier of the set H represents the cooperative frontier. Movements to the
NW along the frontier imply a larger weight given to player 2's objective in the
cooperative agreement (Le., a lower a) while movements to the SE mean larger
weights are given to player 1's objective (Le., larger a). The shaded area of H is
the region of outcomes that are individually rational, referred to as the
negotiation set.. Outcomes for the "bargaining" game may then be restricted to
the negotiation set. Furthermore, feasibility and Pareto optimality require that
the "bargaining" outcome lie along the cooperative frontier. Hence, the
"bargaining" problem reduces to choosing a point (or choosing a value of a)
along the cooperative frontier within the negotiation set (shown as the dark
section of the cooperative frontier in Figure 1). In the absence of a cooperative
agreement, each player receives the "threat point" outcome, which is assumed
to be the Nash "noncooperative" equilibrium point.
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SECTION 4: RESULTS
In this section we study the qualitative effects of asymmetric "wage
contracting profiles" on the dynamic game results using a series of policy
simulation experiments. The game-theoretic equilibria derived in the preceding
section are embedded in the stylized model to address a number of issues:
What is the effect of differing "wage contracting profiles"
on the welfare levels of the respective countries?
What effect does the choice of the policymakers' time
horizon have upon the evolution and result of the dynamic
games?
What impact do labor market asymmetries have on the
incentives to form policy cooperatively?
Do dominant strategies (Le.,policy plays) exist for particular
players?
Do Stackelberg "leader-follower" advantages exist for the
players?
A Fiscal (Monetary) game is defined to be a sequence of fiscal (monetary) plays
by each policymaker, where both policymakers have only the fiscal (monetary)
instrument available in each period, determined prior to the initial period.5
5 If a policymaker were able to use two policy instruments simultaneously, with two targets, he
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Two parameter sets will be used in the following analysis:6
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P.S.'1 :
P.S.'2:
d1
0.2
0.7
d2
0.3
0.3
d3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
1.0
1.0
'1'1
0.5
0.5
'1'2
0.7
0.7
Identical parameter values hold for the foreign country via the symmetry
assumption. As previously discussed, the only parametric asymmetry in the
model exists for the respective country's "wage contracting profile" (y and y*).
Parameter set #1 (P.S.#1) differs from parameter set #2 (P.S.#2) only in the
"degree of openness" parameter (d1 and d1*). The magnitude of this parameter
determines the extent to which a country's "wage contracting profile" is directly
transmitted abroad. This can be seen in equations (4), where the domestic
country's contribution is reproduced here for convenience:
As discussed in Section 2, a greater degree of openness (Le., a larger d1 value)
means that the foreign country's wage behavior, as well as nominal exchange
rate movements, directly impinge upon the domestic country's long run price
level, and so, on its price level movements over time. This is important since, as
can be seen below, a less insulated economy must, by virtue of the parametric
structure of its economy, "eat" some of the other country's volatility without
would be able to achieve his bliss point regardless of the other country's policy actions. Hence,
the question of policy coordination would be moot.
6 Parameter values are obtained from previous studies. In particular, see Currie and Levine
[1985].
demanding some welfare--enhancing tradeoff.
In order to maintain a focus on the labor market asymmetry between the
countries, only symmetric aggregate demand and labor shocks are considered.
These shocks are assumed to be random disturbances which occur in the first
period of the game. The qualitative game-theoretic results are similar for the
aggregate demand and labor shocks, while the latter generally leads to greater
quadratic losses in any particular game. For expositional simplicity, only
symmetric aggregate demand shocks will be presented.7
A. The Welfare Effects of Differing ·Wage Contracting Profiles"
A country's welfare is proxied by a quadratic loss function which
measures the squared deviations of its output and price levels from their
steady-state values (normalized to zero). Therefore, the question of the welfare
effects of differing "wage contracting profiles" is, in essence, a question
regarding the impact of these differing "profiles" on the volatility of output and
price levels. That is, do shorter (less staggered) contracts lead to more or less
volatility in output and price levels? The general result is that shorter contract
lengths ( Le., larger values of nY*) ),ceteris paribus, yield larger quadratic loss
values for all countries. For example, assuming that the foreign country's
contract lengths become shorter so that there is an increase in '( (with "(
constant), there is a welfare loss in both the foreign and domestic countries. The
increased volatility is shared by all participants. Consider the following fiscal and
7 A "period" can most easily be thought of in the following discussion as a year. This designation
will be used in what follows, and they will be used interchangeably. Also, the initial conditions of
'predetermined' state variables (y,y*,p,p*) are set equal to zero, while the 'jump' state variables
are: Wo =wo* =0.5 and eo =0.0. In addition, it is assumed that each target is given equal weight
in each policymaker's optimization problem, i.e,. Ii =(i* =0.5
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monetary games under parameter set #1 in which each country is exposed to
an aggregate demand shock of one unit in the first period of the game. A five
period horizon is assumed for each policymaker.
1. Fiscal Game
The Fiscal policy game is illustrated in Figures 2 & 3.
32
L
Figure 2: Cooperative frontier for a five period Fiscal game (P.S.#1)
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Figure 3: Nash -bargaining- solution & Nash -noncooperative- solution for a
five period Fiscal game (P.8.#1 )
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Figure 2 shows the outward shift in the cooperative frontier for increasing
values of 1* (with y=1), i.e., for shorter foreign contract lengths. Only one point
can be chosen from the cooperative frontier to represent the cooperative
equilibrium point. As discussed above, many different cooperative equilibria
exist all with the proviso that it be Pareto superior to some "threat" point. The
cooperative equilibrium point chosen here is the Nash "bargaining" solution with
the "threat" point being the Nash "noncooperative" equilibrium. These points are
shown in Figure 3 for increasing values of 1*, with the Nash "bargaining" solution
and the Nash "noncooperative" solution designated by the black and white
characters, respectively. As discussed above, the general trend is for larger
quadratic loss values (lower welfare) in both countries as the foreign contract
length decreases. The greater price and output volatility for shorter foreign
contract lengths in the fiscal game is shown in Figures 4 and 5.
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Figure 4: Price level volatility for a five period Nash -noncooperative- Fiscal
game (P.8.#1 )
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Figure 5: Output volatility for a five period Nash -noncooperative- Fiscal game
(P.8.#1 )
pd
65432
2
4
6
-4 -+----..-__.......- ......--.--.;r- -..-...,..--,,..-__---.
o
-2
Figu res 4 and 5 show the evolution of the price level and output, respectively,
over the five periods of the "noncooperative" Nash equilibria for symmetric
(y=y*=1) and asymmetric (1=1 ;(=7) "wage contracting profiles". These pictures
confirm the result observed in Figure 3. Greater price and output volatility in
both countries follow a shortening of foreign contracts. In the Fiscal game,
greater volatility accrues to the country which experiences the shorter contract
length (Le., to the foreign country). This is also supported by Figure 3 in which
the foreign country experiences greater quadratic losses (in absolute terms)
relative to the domestic country.
Table 18
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(y, '() =(1,1)
(y, '() =(1,7)
*
La = l.o = 0.2586 (7.7%)
t
L = L* = 3.3631
J,
*
Lp = l..p = 3.1045 (92.3%)
LO = 0.6795 (13.60/0)
t
L=4.9825
J,
Lp = 4.3030 (86.4%)
*La = 18.0896 (46.6%)
t
L* =38.7984
J,
*lp = 20.7088 (53.4%)
a: A 5 period Nash -noncooperative- Fiscal game is played, with a joint aggregate demand shock of one unit in the
initial period. L (L*) is the domestic (foreign)quadratic loss value, 1.0 (L*o) and Lp (L*p) are the domestic (foreign)
quadratic loss components attributed to ouput volatility and price volatility, respectively. The percentage which each
component contributes to the total quadratic loss is denoted parenthetically.
Table 1 presents the quadratic loss outcomes for a 5 period Nash
"noncooperative" Fiscal game. The symmetric case - (1, y*) =(1,1) - yields
identical quadratic losses for the domestic and foreign countries, i.e.• C. =1.00.
92.3% of the total quadratic loww in each country stems from price volatility,
while the remaining 7.70/0 is caused by output deviations from steady-state over
the five periods of the Fiscal game. Turning to the asymmetric case - (y, y*) =
(1,7) - the foreign quadratic loss is 7.7869 times greater than that of the
L
domestic country, i.e., L* = 7.7869. For the domestic country, most of the loss is
still caused by price volatility where it comprises 86.40/0 of the total loss as
compared to only 13.6% due to output volatility. For the foreign country, a
larger portion of the total quadratic loss is due to output volatility when
compared to the symmetric case. 46.6% of the total foreign loss is due to output
deviations from steady-state while 53.4% is due to price volatility.
Figures 6 and 7 show the evolution of the "jump" variables (w, w*, and e)
and the fiscal policy plays for the 5 period Nash "noncooperative" game. From
Figure 6 one can see that nominal wage rates in both countries are relatively
stable for identical "wage contracting profiles" (y= y* = 1), and the nominal
exchange rate is constant at zero since this reduces to the perfectly symmetric
case and there exists no wedge to drive the exchange rate away from its
steady-state level. In addition, the fiscal policy plays are identical for each
country in the perfectly symmetric case as expected (see Figure 7). Introducing
a shorter foreign "wage contracting profile" - (y, y*) =(1 ,7) - one fin~s that the
domestic and foreign fiscal plays are quite distinct. In fact, the fiscal plays tend
to be opposite one another. When the domestic country enacts a contractionary
fiscal policy the foreign country enacts an expansionary stance and vice versa.
The greater upward foreign price level movement causes a foreign monetary
disequilibrium which necessitates an upward movement in the foreign interest
rate above that in the domestic country (an effect which is supported by the
downward movement in the domestic price level and constant money supplies).
Hence, the nominal exchange rate appreciates (with respect to the domestic
country).
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Figure 6: Nominal Wage Rates and Exchange Rate for a five period Nash
-noncoopertive- Fiscal Game (P.S. #1)
w(1,7)
w&w*(1,1)o
10
-10
W*(1,7)
-20
-30 e(1,1) = 0.0
for all pets. e(1,7)
-40
0 2 3 4 5 pd
Figure 7: Fiscal Policy for a five period Nash -noncooperative- Fiscal Game
(P.S. #1)
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2. Monetary Game
Consider now the Monetary game. The outward shift of the cooperative
frontier and the movement of the Nash "bargaining" - "noncooperative"
solutions for shorter foreign contract lengths are shown in Figures 8 and 9,
respectively.
Figure 8: Cooperative frontier for a five period Monetary game (P.5.#1 )
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Figure 9: Nash "bargaining" solution & Nash "noncooperative" solution for a
five period Monetary game (P.8.#1)
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Figures 8 and 9 of the Monetary game are the analogs of Figures 2 and 3 of the
Fiscal game. Again, in Figure 9 the Nash "bargaining" solution and the Nash
"noncooperative" solution are identified by the black and white characters,
respectively. As in the Fiscal game, quadratic losses are larger for shorter
foreign contract lengths in the Monetary game. Casual observation of Figures 8
and 9 show that the quadratic losses are less favorably skewed toward the
domestic country in the Monetary game as compared to the Fiscal game for the
five period horizon. In addition, there is very little difference between the
"bargaining" and "noncooperative" equilibria in the Monetary game. The
evolution of output and price levels for the Nash "noncooperative" Monetary
game are illustrated in Figures 10 and 11.
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Figure 10: Price level volatility for a five period Nash "noncooperative"
Monetary game (P.8.#1 )
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Figure 11: Output volatility for a five period Nash "noncooperative" Monetary
game (P.8.#1)
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Figure 11: Output volatility for a five period Nash -noncooperative- Monetary
game (P.S.#l )
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Table 28
(y, 'f) = (1,1)
(y, 'f) = (1,7)
*La = La = 0.8482 (61.20k)
t
L =L* = 1.3866
t
*Lp = lp = 0.5384 (38.8%)
La = 5.7270 (75.5%)
t
L=7.5844
t
Lp = 1.8574 (24.5%)
*l..a =7.7398 (71.8%)
i
L* =10.7801
t
*l..p = 3.0403 (28.2%)
a: A 5 period Nash -noncooperative- Monetary game is played, with a joint aggregate demand shock of one unit in the
initial period. l (l*) is the domestic (foreign)quadratic loss value, La (l*o) and lp (l*p) are the domestic (foreign)
quadratic loss components attributed to ouput volatility and price volatility, respectively. The percentage which each
component contributes to the total quadratic loss is denoted parenthetically.
Table 2 presents the quadratic loss outcomes for a 5 period Nash
"noncooperative" Monetary game. As in the Fiscal game, the symmetric case -
(1, f) =(1 , 1) - yields identical quadratic loss values for the domestic and
L
foreign countries, Le., L* =1.00. 61.2% of the total loss is due to output volatility
while the remaining 38.80/0 is due to price volatility in each country. Turning to
the asymmetric case - (1, f) =(1,7) - output volatility plays a primary role in
the total quadratic losses for both countries. The foreign quadratic loss is
L
1.4214 times greater than the domestic quadratic loss, i.e., L* = 1.4214. 75.50/0
of the total domestic quadratic loss is caused by output deviations from steady-
state, with 24.5% caused by price volatility. For the foreign country, 71'.8% of
the quadratic loss is due to output volatility and 28.2% due to price volatility.
Figures 12 and 13 show the evolution of the "jump" variables (w, w·, and
e) and the monetary policy plays for the 5 period Nash "noncooperative" game.
Again, the domestic and foreign policymakers form policy identically and the
endogenous variables evolve identically in the symmetric case - (1, y*) =(1 ,1 ).
Figures 10 and 13 can be combined to show that the foreign real money supply
expands by more than does the domestic real money supply in every period
with a less than offsetting foreign price level expansion in the first four periods
of the game. The fall in the foreign price level in the final period can be
explained by the large exchange rate appreciation in terms of the foreign
country. The foreign excess real money supply necessitates a decrease in the
foreign interest rate below that of the domestic rate, and so, a nominal
exchange rate depreciation. Again, as shown in Figure13, the policy stances of
the domestic and foreign policymakers differ as the foreign country takes a
more expansive monetary stance than does the domestic country in every
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period of the game.
Figure 12: Nominal Wages and Exchange Rate for a five period Nash
-noncooperative- Monetary Game (P.S. '1)
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Figure 13: Monetary Policy for a five period Nash -noncooperative-
Monetary Game (P.S. '1)
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The Monetary game results are similar to those observed in the Fiscal game.
Increased volatility in both countries result from a shortening of contract lengths
in only one of the countries. Regardless of the equilibrium concept and the policy
game, the simulation exercises yield the comparative-static result:
CJL CJL*err > 0; err > O.
B. The Effect of the Policymakers' wTime Horizonw
It is generally accepted that the time horizon of policymakers is
fundamentally conditioned by the particular political institutional framework.
This section considers how the length of the time horizon affects for the
evolution and ultimate outcome of the dynamic policy games. In general, longer
time horizons yield outcomes which are more advantageous to the country with
the shorter contract lengths. Policymakers in the short contract country are
better able to minimize price and output volatility when policy games are played
over a longer period of time. As in the previous section, an aggregate demand
shock of one unit is assumed to strike both countries in the first period.
Parameter set #1 will again be used in the following analysis. A five year horizon
(short horizon) will be contrasted to a ten year horizon (long horizon).
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1. Fiscal Game
Consider the Fiscal game under the short and long horizons. The Nash
"bargaining" and "noncooperative" equilibria are shown for "wage contracting
profile" couplet: ('Y:Y*) =(1,7).
Figure 14: Nash -bargaining- & -noncooperative- equilibria for a five period
Fiscal game (P.8.#1)
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Figure 15: Nash -bargaining- & -noncooperative- equilibria for a ten period
Fiscal game (P.S.#1)
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The claim being made here is that, under the Fiscal game, the short contract
length country (foreign country) fairs better under the long horizon. Figures 14
and 15 demonstrate this well. Although the foreign country's quadratic losses
are much greater than that of the domestic country under both time horizons,
the terms under which a cooperative agreement may be struck are far more
advantageous for the foreign country in the long horizon game as compared to
the short horizon.
The negotiation set 8 can be used as a measure of a country's bargaining
power. In the five period horizon game (Figure 14) the negotiation set extends
from a=.6 to a> .9.9 The Nash "bargaining" equilibrium is (L,L*) =(3.5095,
,/
8 The negotiation set is defined as those points along the cooperative frontier which are Pareto
superior to the "threat point" (i.e., the Nash "noncooperative" equilibrium).
9 Recall that a represents the proportion of the domestic policy goal which is taken into account
in the cooperative agreement, and so, (1-a) is the weight given the foreign policy goal.
Therefore, larger values of a denote more favorable terms for the domestic country under the
cooperative agreement, and vice versa.
30.5709) with a=.836. In contrast, for the ten period horizon game (Figure 15),
the boundaries of the negotiation set are .43 < a <.7. The "bargaining"
equilibrium is (L,L*) =(4.6636,28.8918) with a=.54. Clearly, the foreign country
is in a much better bargaining position under the ten period game where it can
forge a more equitable cooperative equilibrium. This is supported by the result
that the losses associated with both the Nash "bargaining" and "noncooperative"
equilibria are lower in absolute terms for the ten period game eventhough it
includes the five additional periods. The implication is that the short contract
country is better able to curb its price and output volatility when policy is formed
over a longer horizon. Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the evolution of price and/or
output for the five and ten period Fiscal game in the domestic and foreign
countries, respectively, under the Nash "noncooperative" rules.
Figure 16: Evolution of domestic price and output for a five & ten period Nash
-noncooperative- Fiscal game (P.8.#1 )
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Figure 17: Evolution of foreign price & output for a five & ten period Nash
-noncooperative- Fiscal game (P.8.#1 )
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As Figures 14 and 15 demonstrate improved welfare outcomes are obtained by
the short contract country (foreign country) in the long horizon game. This
beneficial welfare effect is primarily due, as shown by Figure 17, a moderation
in price level increases for the ten period game. Foreign output volatility is
comparable for both horizon games.
2. Monetary Game
Now consider the Monetary game under a joint aggregate demand shock
in the initial period. The five and ten period games are illustrated in Figures 18
and 19.
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Figure 18: Nash "bargaining" & "noncooperative" equilibria for a five period
Monetary game (P.8.#1 )
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Figure 19: Nash "bargaining" & "noncooperative" equilibria for a ten period
Monetary game (P.8.#1 )
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Again, the short contract length country (foreign country) is better off relative to
the domestic country in the ten period Monetary game as compared to the five
(y;y*) = (1,7)
"\
P (10 pd.)
period game. Under the five period horizon, the "bargaining" equilibrium is
(L,L*) = (7.5719,10.7539) - a=.7 - with the negotiation set being .59 < a. < .72.
The ten period horizon game yields a "bargaining" equilibrium of (L,L*) =
(30.8075, 18.6247) - a=.42 - with the negotiation set being .25 < a. < .53. Not
only is the bargaining position of the short contract country improved in the ten
period horizon, the welfare level of the short contract country is greater than
that of the long contract country (Le., the quadratic losses are smaller). These
cooperative welfare results are mirrored by the "noncooperative" equilibria for
the short and long time horizons. The Nash "noncooperative" equilibria can be
decomposed into each country's price and output volatility for the five and ten
period horizons.
Figure 20: Evolution of domestic price and output in a five and ten period
Nash -noncooperative- Monetary game (P.8.#1 )
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Figure 21 : Evolution of foreign price and output for a five and ten period Nash
-noncooperative- Monetary game (P.S.#1)
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The effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies in this setting can be
gauged by the average welfare per period for both horizons. In this way,
quadratic loss values may be placed on equal footing.
Table 3a
Quadratic Average Negotiation
Lossb Welfare Lossb Set
L L* L L*- CIL URpd pd
Fiscal
5 pd: 4.98 38.80 .996 7.76 .6· .9+
10 pd: 5.11 29.44 .511 2.94 .43 .7
Monetary
5 pd: 7.58 10.78 1.52 2.16 .59 .72
10 pd: 31.56 19.08 3.16 1.91 .25 .53
a:A joint aggregate demand shock of one unit in the initial period is assumed along with the "wage
contracting profile" couplet (1,"(')=(1,7);
.
b:These are the Nash "noncooperative" equilibrium values.
Table 3 neatly summarizes the previous discussion concerning the welfare
implications of the chosen time horizon. The short contract length country
(foreign country), for both the Monetary and Fiscal games, achieves a lower
'per period' volatility level as well as an improved bargaining position with the ten
period horizon as compared to the five period horizon. The improved
bargaining position of the foreign country can come only at the expense of the
long contract length (domestic) country. The domestic country achieves a lower
average volatility level with the ten period horizon only in the Fiscal game.
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C. Incentives to Form Cooperative Policy
The incentives and disincentives which individual countries have to form
policy cooperatively are many and varied. They stretch beyond this study, in
particular, and beyond economic analysis, in general. Rather, a complete
answer to the study of policy cooperation must encompass the complex socio-
economic-political interrelationships which define the country (or countries) in
question. This study attempts to add to the broader task by analyzing the
incentives and disincentives to form policy cooperatively for two countries which
differ only in their "wage contracting profiles, that is, in the degree of staggering
and length of their labor contracts.
Discussions on the incentives to cooperate focus on the welfare gains
made by each country in forming a cooperative agreement (Nash "bargaining"
equilibrium point) relative to the assumed "threat point" (Nash "noncooperative"
equilibrium point), and by the weight given a country's policy goals in the
cooperative agreement (given by a for the domestic country and (1-a) for the
foreign country). The former measure is self-explanatory, while the latter
measure can be understood by noting that there do exist limits to which any
nation would sacrifice its own policy goals to form some cooperative agreement.
For two countries which are identical in all ways except for this labor market
asymmetry, there is no ostensible reason why either policymaker would settle
for anything less than an equal share in the cooperative objective. Welfare gains
under a cooperative arrangement must be sufficient to compensate a country
for accepting less than an equal share.
Assuming that the world is composed of a "short horizon" policymaker,
Table 4 presents the "Gains from Bargaining" and "Policy Objective Weights" for
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Table 4 indicates that foreign welfare gain increases in the Fiscal
game as the foreign wage contracts become shorter, while the domestic welfare
gain decreases. For (y,'() = (1,7), the foreign country has a welfare gain that is
5.59 times larger than the domestic country under P.S.#1 and 3.05 times larger
under P.S.#2. Not only are the relative welfare gains greater for the short
contract country under the Fiscal game with a low degree of "openness"
(P.S.#1), they are far greater in absolute terms. Although having greater "Gains
from Bargaining" in both Fiscal games, it comes at the expense of a much lower
weight in the cooperative objective. In fact, the larger absolute gains in P.S.#1
relative to P.S.#2 require a greater sacrifice in the objective.
For the Monetary games, the "Gains from Bargaining" decrease in
general as the foreign country's contract shortens. This result sharply differs
from the Fiscal games. With a low degree of "openness" (d1 =d1 * =0.2), the
foreign country faces the undesirable prospect of smaller cooperative gains as
its contract lengths shorten while also sacrificing more of its policy goals in the
cooperative objective. For (y,'() =(1,7), the short contract country achieves
bargaining gains that are 2.08 times the long contract country. This is less than
half of the relative gains made in the corresponding Fiscal game (FiscaIjP.S.#1).
The Monetary game with a high degree of "openness" (Monetary/P.S.#2) is the
only case for which a < 0.5 and where the long contract country has greater
bargaining gains.
What conclusions can be drawn from the above results regarding the
incentives and disincentives to coordinate policy? Under the structural
environment in which each country is relatively insulated from the other's wage
contracting process (P.S.#1), coordination is an increasingly welfare-enhancing
option for the short contract country in the Fiscal game if the short contract
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country is willing to pay the long contract country to absorb some of its
additional volatility. The form of this remuneration is the sacrifice of a portion of
its policy objective in the cooperative agreement. This cost is seemingly large in
that the foreign policy goals receive a weight of only 0.16 for (y,f) = (1,7). By
way of contrast, the corresponding Monetary game yields Nash "bargaining"
outcomes which are of decreasing benefit to each player while still requiring the
short contract country to sacrifice some of its policy goals. For (y,y) = (1,7), the
cooperative weight of the foreign policy goals is 0.30.
With a larger degree of exposure to the wage contracting process
abroad (P.S.#2) the gains from cooperation are more equally shared among
the competing countries and the cooperative weights are more equally
distributed as compared to their P.S.#1 counterparts. The effect of the degree
of "openness" on the five period game-theoretic outcomes is illustrated in
Figu res 22 and 23.
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Figure 22: Degree of ·Openness· for a five period Fiscal game
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Figure 23: Degree of ·Openness· for a five period Monetary game
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Quadratic loss values are lower in the Fiscal game (Figure 22) for the
short contract length country when wage contracting exposure is high. Losses
are higher for the long contract length country. The foreign country is able to
export some of its volatility to the domestic country by virtue of the parametric
structure of the economy. In contrast to this is the Monetary game (Figure 23) in
which both countries suffer higher quadratic loss values for larger degrees of
"openness". In this case the long contract country is the prime beneficiary of
reduced wage contract exposure from abroad.
Some general results are worth noting. The long contract length country
is never better off by having increased vulnerability to the wage contracting
process of the short contract length country. In addition, quadratic losses are
more equally shared under both Monetary and Fiscal games when there is a
high degree of "openness". The bargaining position of the foreign country
(represented by 1--a) also improves when mutual exposure is high. The intuition
here is that the parametric structure of the economy forces, when the degree of
"openness" is large, the domestic country to absorb volatility from abroad
without demanding compensation.
D. Dominant Strategies 10
Thus far, only matched policy plays, in which the policy instruments are
identical in the two countries, have been used in analyzing the welfare effects of
differing "wage contracting profiles". This section addresses the question of
whether "dominant strategies" (Le., policy plays) exist for particular players
(short or long contract length countries). Nash "noncooperative" equilibria for a
symmetric aggregate demand shock of one unit in the initial period are
compared to determine whether particular policy instruments yield more
desireable game-theoretic welfare outcomes. A dominant strategy is defined as
follows. Denote Ni j as the domestic quadratic loss where the domestic country
plays policy i (i=M,F) given that the foreign country plays policy j (j=M*,F*).
Likewise, N*i j represents the foreign quadratic loss where the foreign country
plays policy i (i=M*,F*) in response to a domestic policy play of j (j=M,F). Fiscal
policy is a "dominant strategy" for the domestic country if:
10 A dominant strategy in this context refers to games in which policymakers can choose only
one instrument at the beginning of the game and must use this instrument for all periods of the
game. This is contrasted with the case in which policymakers have only one instrument at their
disposal but may choose the instrument in every period.
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Simply put, the domestic country is always better off by using fiscal policy,
irrespective of the policy choice by the foreign country. Similarly, foreign fiscal
policy is a "dominant strategy" if:
The converse holds for monetary policy in both countries. The quadratic loss
outcomes are presented in Table 5.
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Table sa
(1.'() / NMM* NFM* / NMF* NFF*/ N*M*M N*F*M / N*M*F N*F*F /
5 pd/P.S.#1
(1,1) I 1.39 2.71 I 1.50 3.36 I 1.39 2.71 I 1.50 3.36 /
(1,3) 2.52 160.40 2.12 1.14 3.00 4.67 6.47 9.53
(1,5) 4.56 1599.84 3.13 2.62 5.98 9.79 859.84 22.20
(1,7) 7.58 537.72 4.42 4.98 10.78 16.46 m.33 38.80
5 pd/P.S.#2
(1 ,1) I 2.17 2.20 I 2.56 1.29 I 2.17 2.20 I 2.56 1.29 I
(1,3) 3.70 318.96 4.36 2.61 3.24 3.41 94.28 3.13
(1,5) 6.46 817.68 7.11 4.84 6.18 6.96 218.37 6.54
(1,7) 11.12 1018.82 10.44 8.24 11.21 11.63 301.16 12.17
10 pd/P.S.#1
(1,1) I 1.43 8.55 I 8.50 1.33 I 1.43 8.55 I 8.50 1.33 I
(1,3) 4.64 31.55 8.52 1.42 4.52 10.49 174.01 6.94
(1,5) 14.60 22.57 11.85 2.47 10.38 12.63 95.46 16.33
(1,7) 31.56 28.37 16.06 5.11 19.07 17.94 110.22 29.44
10 pd/P.S.#2
(1,1) I 2.16 1.37 I 5.68 21.72 I 2.16 1.37 I 5.68 21.72 I
(1,3) 4.23 690.49 6.05 5.98 11.97 2.74 299.99 8.54
(1,5) 12.93 1096.97 8.46 18.61 11.42 5.32 813.02 24.46
(1,7) 25.51 3891.76 11.50 37.00 20.41 9.15 2402.21 48.14
a: A joint aggregate demand shock of one unit in the initial period is assumed for the Nash
"noncooperative" equilibria is assumed.
Table 5 indicates that there is no one clear preferred strategy for both
time horizons and degrees of "openness". With a five period horizon,
policymakers are generally better off matching policies as "wage contracting
profiles" become more disparate. For a large degree of "openness", matched
policy strategies are indicated for all "wage contracting profile" couplets. For a
small degree of "openness" (P.S.#1), matched policy strategies are optimal for
more asymmetric "wage contracting profiles", while monetary policy is a
"dominant strategy" with more symmetric aggregate contract lengths. Under the
ten period horizon, matched policy strategies are preferred for P.S.#1 from
(y,f) =(1 ,1) to (1 ,5). For (y,f) =(1 ,7), fiscal policy is a "dominant strategy" for
both the domestic and foreign countries. With a larger degree of "openness"
(P.S.#2), monetary policy is a "dominant strategy" for the domestic country and
fiscal policy is a "dominant strategy" for the foreign country as "wage
contracting profiles" become more asymmetric (Le., y=1 and f=5,7). The short
contract length COl:Jntry obtains lower quadratic loss values by relying on fiscal
policy, while the long contract length country is better off by using monetary
policy. Table 6 interprets these results given in Table 5.
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Table 6
Domestic Foreign
(1,'() Country Country
(1,1) Monetary Monetary
(1,3) M.P.(F) Monetary
(1,5) M.P.(F) M.P.(M)
(1,7) M.P.(F) M.P.(M)
(1,1) M.P.(F) M.P.(F)
(1,3) M.P.(F) M.P.(F)
(1,5) M.P.(F) M.P.(M)
(1,7) M.P.(F) M.P.(M)
(1,1) M.P.(F) M.P.(F)
(1,3) M.P.(F) M.P.(M)
(1,5) M.P.(F) M.P.(M)
(1,7) Fiscal Fiscal
(1,1) A.P.(F) A.P.(F)
(1,3) M.P.(M) Fiscal
(1,5) Monetary Fiscal
(1,7) Monetary Fiscal
M.P.:: "Matched Policy" : a country uses the same policy instrument as that used by the
opponent;
A.P.:: "Alternative Policy": a country uses a different policy instrument than that used by the
opponent;
(F): fiscal policy is the preferred instrument;
(M): monetary policy is the preferred instrument.
Within the class of "matched policy" outcomes, one can use Table 5 to
determine the policy preferences (fiscal versus monetary policy) of the
and foreign countries. These results are indicated by the parenthetical
designation in Table 6. Under the short horizon problem, one finds that the
domestic country has a distinct preference for fiscal policy, while the foreign
country prefers monetary policy (both played as matched games) as "wage
contracting profiles" become more asymmetric. For the "wage contracting"
couplets - ("f,f) = (1,5) & (1,7) - both countries prefer matched games, but
there exists a disagreement over which policy should be used in the matched
game. The foreign country would like it to be a monetary game and the domestic
country prefers it to be a fiscal game. Shifting to a longer horizon (10 period),
some policy disagreements still exist. With a high degree of "openness" (P.S.#2),
one finds that the foreign country will pursue a fiscal policy regardless of the
domestic policy instrument, while the domestic country will use monetary
irrespective of the foreign policy instrument (for larger "wage contracting
profile" asymmetries).
The results in Table 6 indicate which policy instruments are most effective
in minimizing the country's price and output volatility given the other country's
instrument. In general, a policy instrument will be preferred if it can generate
an exchange rate appreciation. Following an initial positive aggregate demand
shock, an appreciation of its currency will decrease the pressure on aggregate
demand and will reduce the pressure on price increases. Table 6 indicates that
the preferred policy instruments generally differ between the short and long
contract length countries. This model has nothing to say about the manner in
which these policy disagreements are to be resolved. Rather, it does posit
wherein particular incentives exist regarding the choice of policy instruments.
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E. Stackelberg wleader-followerwAdvantages
The industrial organization literature has spent some time considering
the question of whether firms have any incentive (in terms of yielding greater
profits) to play the role of Stackelberg "leader" or "follower" relative to other
firms in establishing some quantity of output level or some price for its good.
The answer seems to depend upon whether firms are competing in price space
or output space, and on whether the goods which the firms produce are
"substitutes" or "complements". The intuition here is that a firm would prefer to
be "leader" if it is able to make some preemptive move relative to the competing
firm, while Stackelberg "follower" is the desired role if the firm is able to copy or
undercut the "leader" profitably. The preemptive incentive is demonstrated in
Dixit [1980] when an incumbent firm invests in excess capacity as a deterrence
to entry, while the latter can occur when an entrant undercuts the price of the
incumbent as in the contestable market literature (Baumol [1982]).11 By
comparing quadratic loss outcomes for the Stackelberg "leader" and "follower"
within the context of this two country model, this section attempts to extend the
intuition derived from the industrial organization literature into the international
policy coordination framework. The focus here is on whether "wage contracting
profile" asymmetries yield "leader" or "follower" advantages to either the short
or long contract length countries.
Attention again centers upon the short horizon game ( 5 periods). Table 7
presents the quadratic loss results for domestic "leader"(SL)-foreign
"follower"(SF*) and foreign "leader" (SL*)--domestic "foliower"(SF) games.
11 See Gal-Or [1985]
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Table 7a
(1.1') . Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Leader Follower Follower Leader
(SL) (SF*) (SF) (SL*)
FiscaI/P.S.I1
(1.1 ) -Q.5091 3.6273 3.6273 0.5091
(1,3) 0.9031 10.3685 0.7541 8.9522
(1.5) 1.9943 22.0322 1.7842 19.3969
(1,7) 4.0587 38.3685 3.6352 34.1932
(1,9) 7.0819 59.3663 6.3336 53.2691
Fiscal/P.8.#2
(1,1) 1.4391 1.1529 1.1529 1.4391
(1,3) 2.6752 2.9417 2.5731 3.0463
(1,5) 4.8365 6.4207 4.8536 6.2190
(1,7) 8.1809 11.9618 8.1633 11.6545
(1,9) 12.6400 19.9720 12.5514 19.6152
Monet./P.8.#1
(1,1) 1.3804 1.3312 1.3312 1.3804
(1,3) 2.5180 2.9761 2.5277 2.9902
(1,5) 4.5620 5.9726 4.5758 5.9642
(1,7) 7.5871 10.7445 7.5676 10.7789
(1,9) 11.5553 17.5003 11.5248 17.6121
Monet./p.8.#2
(1,1) 1.8960 1.4803 1.4803 1.8960
(1,3) 3.6171 2.8346 3.2253 3.1029
(1,5) 6.8575 5.8246 6.1392 6.1281
(1,7) 12.3727 10.4898 10.7864 11.1936
(1,9) 20.2911 16.7679 17.3090 18.3354
a: A joint aggregrate demand shock of one unit in the initial period is assumed, along with a five
period horizon.
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Using Table 7, the domestic country would prefer to be a Stackelberg "leader"
("follower") if SL «» SF. Similarly, the foreign country would prefer to be a
Stackelberg "leader" ("follower") if SL* «» SF*.
Under the Fiscal games one finds that the long contract length country
(domestic country) is better off playing the "follower" role and the short contract
length country (foreign country) the Stackelberg "leader" role as "wage
contracting profiles" become more asymmetric (y* ~ 7). The foreign "Ieader"-
domestic "follower" preference exists for all asymmetric "wage contracting
profiles" in P.S.#1, but only appears in P.S.#2 for greater "profile" asymmetries.
The foreign country has an incentive to precommit to some fiscal policy stance in
every period (given that it understands the domestic country's optimization
problem), while the domestic country is perfectly willing to allow this to occur.
The domestic country can minimize its losses by reacting to the foreign
country's policy decision. Hence, there exists a well-defined Stackelberg
equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figures 24 and 25 for (y,y*) =(1,7).
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Figure 24: Stackelberg Equilibrium for a five period Fiscal game (P.8.#1 )
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Figures 24 and 25 place the two Stackelberg equilibria with the Nash
"noncooperative" and "bargaining" solutions. In each case, the domestic
"follower"-foreign "leader" Stackelberg equilibrium (white square) is the
preferred Stackelberg outcome, both of which dominate the Nash
"noncooperative" result and neither of which dominate the "bargaining" solution.
In the Monetary games, with larger "wage contracting profile"
asymmetries, the domestic and foreign countries both have incentives to play
the role of Stackelberg "follower". Neither player has an incentive to be the first
mover in the Monetary game, but rather, would prefer to react to its opponent's
monetary stance. This result is illustrated in Figures 26 and 27 for (y,y*) = (1,7).
67
(y,y*) = (1,7)
a
For. "Ieader"-
Dom. "follower"
Nash "noncoop."
A
•
Nash Barg.
•
Dom. "Ieader"-
For. "follower"
7.57
7.56
L
Figure 26: Stackelberg Equilibrium for a five period Monetary game (P.S.#1 )
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Figure 27: Stackelberg Equilibrium for a five period Monetary game (P.S.#2)
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There does not exist a well-defined Stackelberg equilibrium for either
Monetary game. With each player attempting to be a "follower" the most
intuitive resolution of this game is the Nash "noncooperative" equilibrium.
Note that if the foreign country was able to play the "follower" role (black
welfare gains beyond those obtained in the "bargaining" equilibrium for both
p.S.#1 and P.S.#2. The same holds for the domestic country only for P.S.#1.
However, allowing one country to be the "follower" would impose large
quadratic losses on the "leader", and so, not a reasonable outcome of the
Monetary game.
Drawing upon the intuition from the industrial organization literature, a
policymaker will prefer to be a "follower" if the available policy instrument
enables the policymaker to offset any pol.icy action by the other country. The
Stackelberg "leader" has the first policy move in the game and incorporates the
"follower's" policy reaction into his own optimization problem. A policymaker
with an ineffective policy instrument may prefer to use this additional information
regarding the opponent's policy reaction function and precommit to some policy
stance. This is consistent with the outcomes for the Fiscal games under P.S. #1
and P.S. #2, where the fiscal instrument is the preferred instrument by the
domestic policymaker for the 5 period horizon under the Nash "noncooperative"
equilibrium. From Figures 24 and 25 we see that there is a well-<lefined
Stackelberg equilibrium in which the domestic country is the "follower" and the
foreign country is the "leader". Under the Monetary games, there is no well-
defined Stackelberg equilibrium for either P.S. #1 or P.S. #2. Again, using the
Nash "noncooperative" outcomes as a guide to an instrument's effectiveness, we
know that the domestic country does marginally better than the foreign country
(see Table 4). However, monetary policy is the preferred policy instrument of
the foreign policymaker. In this case each player wishes to be a Stackelberg
"follower".
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SECTION 5: CONCLUSIONS
This paper has looked at a number of issues regarding the impact of
differing "wage contracting profiles" on the policy strategies and
macroeconomic performance of two countries engaged in a multi-period
dynamic game. In general, it is found that both countries experience welfare
losses as the contract lengths in one of the countries shortens. The additional
volatility in prices and output are shared internationally. In addition, for
games in which policymakers operate under a short horizon, the greater
inertia present in the long contract country is a desirable feature as
measured by the game-theoretic welfare outcomes. However, lengthening
the policymakers' time horizon results in more advantageous welfare
outcomes for the short contract country.
In most cases, the long contract country has a much stronger
bargaining position relative to the short contract country in forming a
cooperative agreement. Under the short horizon, Fiscal games result in
greater welfare gains from bargaining for the short contract country at the
expense of its own policy goals in the cooperative objective. Whether the short
contract country is willing to pay such a price for a cooperative agreement is
an open question. The bargaining position of the short contract country is
improved in the Monetary games, but the gains from bargaining are lower
and are diminishing as "wage contracting profiles" become more asymmetric.
These results are supported by fact that, under a short horizon, the long
contract country prefers to playa Fiscal game while the short contract
country prefers a Monetary game. The identification of dominant strategies
suggest that the institutional contracting asymmetries do form differing views
on the effectiveness of policy instruments in the respective countries.
Finally, in a short horizon Fiscal game, there is a well-defined
Stackelberg equilibrium where the short contract country prefers the
Stackelberg "leader" role and the long contract country is better off as the
"follower". This is contrasted with the Monetary game in which both players
prefer the "follower" role. In general, a preference for the "follower" role
infers some ability to effectively counteract moves made by the "leader" with
the policy tool at hand. This may explain why the short contract country has
lower welfare losses as the Stackelberg "leader" in the Fiscal game and as
the "follower" in the Monetary game, since monetary policy is its preferred
policy tool under the short horizon.
In addition to the results summarized above, this paper employs a
more appealing wage contracting process. In contrast to much previous
work which assumes that current wage demands are based on the past
values of the relevant variables or on their current values alone, this paper
posits rational agents who make thei r wage demands based on the futu re
evolution of the variables to which they attach importance for the period in
which the contract will be in effect. This enables one to capture the different
horizons which wage-setters have in the long contract country as opposed to
the short contract country. Given this more realistic modeling of wage-setting
behavior, this paper has provided some insight into the effect that "wage
contracting profile" asymmetries ( differences in labor markets) have on the
formation of policy in an interdependent world.
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Appendix A
1. Nash Equilibrium: Recursive Solution
In order to validate the general form recursive solution for the Nash
equilibrium, the recursive technique is extended for two periods. The general
recursive form can then be easily detected.
Period T-1
In period T-1, the final period in which policy is formed, the domestic
policymaker minimizes the objective function for period T. The one-period
dynamic programming problem takes the form:
subject to xT = A ~-1 + C Ur-1 + C* u*T-1 + F vT_1
where VT+1 is the optimal value of the problem solved in period T. It is assumed
that VT+1 = 0 since the current government cares not for its country's welfare
beyond the T periods of the game. Substituting the constraint, the policymaker's
problem becomes:
( 1N) Min{u } [A ~-1 + C uT- 1 + C* u*T_1 + F vT_1 ]' D~_1T-1
[A ~-1 +C uT_1+C* u*T_1 + F vT_1 )
N
where Df-1 = K.
The first-order condition is:
aVT
= 2 C' D~_1 [A X-r-1 + C u,--1 + C* u*T_1 + F vT_1 ] = 0
au,-_1
The domestic reaction function for period T-1 is then:
ii
(2N)
where
N
u,--1 = - GT- 1 [A X-r-1 + F vT_1 + C* u*T_1 ]
G~_1 = [C' ~-1 C ]-1 C' D~_1
Similarly, the foreign reaction function for period T-1 is:
(3N)
where
U*T_1 = - G*~_1 [A xT_1 + F vT_1 + C u,--1 ]
G*N = [C*' D*N C* ]-1 C*' D*NT-1 T-1 T-1
D*N = K*T-1
Substituting equation ( 3N ) into equation ( 2N ), the Nash policy feedback rule
for the domestic country at time T-1 is:
iii
(4N)
where
N -1 N~-1 = - (R!-1) ST-1 [A Xr-1 + F vT_1 ]
~-1 = I - { [G~_1 C* ] [ G*~_1 C ] }
Sr~1 = G~_1 [I - C* G*~1 ]
Substituting equation ( 2N ) into equation ( 3N ) yields the Nash policy feedback
rule for the foreign country at time T-1:
( 5N ) u*T-1 = - {R*~_1)-1 S*~_1 [A xT_1 + F vT_1 ]
where R*~_1 = I - { [G*~_1 C ] [ G~_1 C* ] }
S*~_1 = G*~_1 [I - C G~_1 ]
Thus, the Nash equilibrium policy feedback rules depend upon the current
values of the state variables and the current values of the random shocks.
Substituting equations ( 4N ) and ( 5N ) into equation ( 1N ) yields the optimal
value of the domestic country's time T quadratic loss function:
where o~ = I _ C {RN )-1 ~ _ C* {R*N )-1 S*N
-.-1 T-1 --r-1 T-1 T-1
Substituting the Nash feedback rules into the foreign country analogue to
equation ( 1N ) yields:
V*T = (A "r-1 + F vT_1 )' [a' T~1 D*~_1 a~_1 ] (A x,--1 + F vT_1 )
Period T-2
Moving backward one period from period T-1 , consider the domestic
policymaker's optimization problem at time T-2:
subject to xT_1 = A ~-2 + C ~-2 + C* u*T-2 + F vT_2
The optimization problem can then be rewritten as:
Min{U } [A ~-2+ C uT_2+ C* u*T_2 + F vT_2 ]' D~_2T-2
[A Xr-2 + C uT_2+ C* u*T_2 + F vT_2 ]
N ,N N N
where Df-2 = K + [a T-1 DT- 1 OT-1 ].
The resulting fi rst-order condition for period T-2 is:
iv
The domestic country's reaction function takes the form:
v
where GN = [C' r{J Cl-1 C' ONT-2 ~-2 T-2
Likewise, the foreign country's reaction function is:
where G*N = [C*' O*N C* ]-1 C*' O*NT-2 T-2 T-2
O*~_2 = K* + A' [ 0' ~-1 O*~_1 O~_1 1A
The resulting Nash equilibrium feedback policy rules for the domestic and
foreign countries in period T-2 are:
where
where
N -1 N
Ur-2 = - (Rf-2) ST-2 [A ~-2 + F vT_2 ]
Rr~2 = I - { [G~_2 C·] [G·~_2C]}
~-2 = G~_2 [I - C· G·~_2]
R·~_2 = I - { [G·~_2 C] [G~_2C·]}
S·~_2 = G·~_2 [I - C G~_2]
vi
The optimized values of the period T-2 domestic and foreign objective functions
are then:
where o~ = I_ C (RN )-1 ~ _ C. (R.N )-1 S·N
",-2 T-2 1-2 T-2 T-2
V·T- 1 = (A ~-2+ F vT_2 )' [Q' T~2 D·~_2 ~-2] (A xT_2 + F vT_2 )
2. Stackelberg Equilibrium: Recursive Solution
Again solving backward from period T-1, the general recursive form can
be identified after two periods.
Period T-1
The optimization problem for the foreign country in the Stackelberg game
is identical to that of the foreign country in the Nash noncooperative game. The
foreign count.ry's reaction function is then:
vii
( 1S )
where G*S = [C*' O*S C* ]-1 C*' O*ST-1 T-1 T-1
o*S = K*T-1
The domestic country, as Stackelberg "leader", optimizes its objective function
taking into account the reaction function of the "follower". The Stackelberg
"leader's" problem in period T-1 is then:
subject to XT =A xT_1+ C Ur-1 + C· u· T-1 + F vT_1
and equation (1 S).
Substituting the constraints yields:
(2S) Min{U } [A ~-1 + F vT_1 + C uT_1 ]'T-1
{ [ I - C· G~_1]' D~_1 [I - C· G·~_1 ]} [A xT_1 + F vT_1 + C uT_1]
s
where DT-1 = K.
The first-order condition is:
Solving for uT-1 yields the Stackelberg "leader" policy rule for period T-1 :
viii
(3S)
where
S -1 S
u,--1 = - (Rf-1 C) RT- 1 [A xT_1 + F vT_1 ]
~ = C' [ I - C* G*S ]' OS [I - C* G*S ]
",-1 T-1 T-1 T-1
ix
Substituting the "leader's" policy rule into the "follower's" reaction function, the
"follower's" policy rule is formed:
(4S)
where
U*T-1 = -S*~_1[A~_1 + FVT_1 ]
8 *8 8 -1 8
S*T-1 = G T-1 {I- C ( Rf-1 C) RT- 1 }
Substituting equation ( 3S ) into equation ( 2S ), the optimal value of the period
T-1 domestic objective function is:
where
Substituting equations ( 3S ) and ( 4S) into the foreign country analogue to
equation ( 1S) yields/the optimal value of the period T-1 foreign objective
function:
where . 8 8 -1 8 * *80*T-1 = [I - C (RT-1 C) RT- 1 - C S T-1 ]
x
Period T-2
Moving back one period, we begin again by deriving the foreign country's
reaction function. As in the previous period, the period T-2 Stackelberg
follower's optimization problem is identical to its period T-2 noncooperative
Nash problem. The foreign country's reaction function is then:
(5S)
where G*8 = [C*' 0*8 C* ]-1 C*' 0*8T-2 T-2 T-2
0*8 = K* + A' [Q*' 8 0*8 0*(8 T-1)] AT-2 T-1 T-1 I
Now consider the domestic country's ("leader's") period T-2 optimization
problem:
and equation (55).
By substitution, the domestic minimization problem can be rewritten as:
(65) Min{U } [A Xr-2 + F vT_2 + C uT_2 ]'T-2
xi
where
{[ 1- C* G*~_2]' D~_2 [1- C* G*~_2]} [A xT_2 + F vT_2 + C ~-2]
~-2 = K + A' [ 0' ~-1 D~_1 ~-1 ] A.
Taking the first-order condition - ~VT-1 = a - the 5tackelberg "leader"
uT-2
policy rule is:
(75)
where
S -1 S~-2 = - (Rf-2 C) RT- 2 [A xT_2+ F vT_2 ]
~ = C' [ I - C* G*S ]' OS [ I - C* G*S ]
".-2 T-2 T-2 T-2
Using equations (55 ) and ( 75 ), the 5tackelberg "follower's" policy rule is:
U*T_2 = - S*~_2 [A Xr-2 + F vT_2 ]
where S*~_2 = G*~_2 {I - C ( ~-2 C)-1 R~_2}
The resulting optimized objective functions for the Stackelberg "leader" and
"follower" in period T-2 are:
VT_1 = (A xT_2+ F vT_2 )' [0' ;-2 D~_2 0~_2] (A ~-2 + F vT_2 )
where ~-2 = [1- C* G*;_2] [1- C (R;_2 C)-1 R~_2]
V*T_1 = (A Xr-2 + F vT_2 )' [0*' ~-2 D*~_2 0*;_2] ( A "1--2 + F vT_2 )
where 0*;_2 = [I - C (~-2 C)-1 R~_2 - C* S*~_2]
3. Cooperative Frontier: Recursive Solution
The general recursive solution for the cooperative equilibrium is derived
by considering the last two periods of the cooperative game. The single
optimization problem is formed by taking a weighted average (a) of the domestic
and foreign quadratic lossfunctions.
xii
Period T-1
The constrained minimization problem for period T-1 is:
subject to xT = A ~-1 + C uT_1 + C* u*T_1 + F vT_1
Substituting the constraints into the objective function, the minimization problem
becomes:
xiii
Min{u & u* }T-1 T-1 [ A "r-1 + C uT_1 + C* u*T_1 + F vT-1 ]' HT_1
[A xT_1 + C uT_1 + C* u*T_1 + F vT- 1 ]
where ~-1 = [a D~_1 + (1-a) D*~_1 ]
CDT-1 = K
D*C = K*T-1
The first~rder conditions with respect to uT-1 and uT-1 * yield:
u,--1 = - G~_1 [A ~-1 + F vT_1 + C* u*T_1 ]
xiv
where
C -1
GT- 1 = [C' H,--1 C] C' HT_1
U*T_1 = - G* ~-1 [A ~-1 + F vT_1 + C uT_1 ]
where G* TC_1 = [C*' H C*] -1 C*' HT-1 T-1
Solving the first-order conditions simultaneously, the domestic and foreign
policy feedback rules are:
C -1 C
u,--1 = - (RT-1) ST-1 [A x T_1 + F vT_1 ]
where
where
~-1 = I - [G~_1 C*] [G*~_1 C ]
~ GC [I - C* G*C ]1-1 = T-1 T-1
C -1 C
u*T_1 = - (R*T-1) S*T-1 [ A XT-1 + F vT_1 ]
R*~_1 = I - [G*~_1 C] [G~_1 C* ]
S*~_1 = G*~_1 [I - C ~-1 ]
The corresponding minimized objective function is:
where
VT = (A ~-1 + F vT_1 )' [0' ~-1 HT_1~-1] (A ~-1 + F vT_1 )
o~ = [I _ C (~ )-1 ~ _ C* (R*C )-1 S*C ]
-.-1 ·1-1 '1-1 T-1 T-1
xv
Noting that HT-1 =aD-r-1 + (1-a)0*T-1 , the minimized quadratic loss functions
for the domestic and foreign country are:
Vf T = (A ~-1 + F vT_1 )' [0' ~-1 ( (1-a) 0*;_1 ) ~-1] (A xT_1 + F vT_1 )
Period T-2
The single optimization problem for period T-2 is:
subject to xT_1 = A Xr-2 + C uT_2 + C* u*T_2 + F vT_2
Substituting the constraints into the objective function and redefining terms, the
optimization problem can be rewritten as:
Min{u & u· }T-2 T-2
xvi
where ~-2 = [a D~_2 + (1--a) D*~_2]
~-2 = K + A' [ a' ~-1 D~_1 a ~-1 ] A
D*~_2 = K* + A' [a' ~-1 D* ~-1 a~_1] A
The first-order conditions with respect to uT-2 and u*T-2 yield:
where C -1GT- 2 = [C' Hy-2 C] C' HT_2
where G* C = [C*' H C* ] -1 C*' H~2 ~2 ~2
Solving the first-order conditions for uT-2 and U*T-2' the optimal domestic and
foreign policy rules are:
where
where
C -1 C
Ur-2 = - (Rf-2) ST-2 [A xT_2 + F vT_2 ]
~-2 = I - [G~_2 C*] [G*;_2 C ]
~-2 = G~_2 [I - C* G*~_2 ]
R*~_2 = 1 - [G*;_2 C) [G;_2 C*]
S*;_2 = G*~_2 [I - C ~-2 ]
xvii
The minimized period T-2 objective function is given by:
VT_1 = (A xT_2 + F vT_2 )' [0' ~-2 HT_2 0;-2] (A ~-2 + F vT_2 )
where o~ = [1- C (~ )-1 ~ _ C* (R*C )-1 S*C ]
"1-2 '.-2 1-2 T-2 T-2
Again using the fact that HT-2 = aD-r-1 + (1-a)D*T-1 ,the minimized domestic and
foreign quadratic loss functions are:
Vd (T-1) = (A "r-2 + F vT_2 )' [0' ~-2 (a D~_2 ) r4-2] (A "r-2 + F vT_2 )
Vf (T-1) = (A xT- 2 + F vT_2 )' [0' ~-2 ( (1--a) D'~_2 ) r4-2] (A xT_2 + F vT- 2 )
TESTS FOR LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS: A CRITIQUE
Abstract
Much empirical work has been devoted to estimating the proportion of liquidity
constrained consumers (P) and the fraction of income held by these liquidity
constrained consumers (L). A common feature of these studies is that P and L
are taken to be constant over time. This paper attempts to determine whether
this assertion is empirically justified. Using panel data, we find that P and L do
vary over time with trend and cyclical components. Hence, this study shows that
it is incorrect to estimate P and L as fixed parameters over time, and that P and
L should instead be treated endogenously.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most widely debated issues in the study of consumer behavior
is the validity of the "Life Cycle - Permanent Income Hypothesis" (LC-PIH). In its
purest form, the LC-PIH posits the existence of rational, forward-looking
agents, constrained only by expected lifetime income endowments, who smooth
consumption over their entire life. Capital markets are assumed to be perfect
so that agents may lend and borrow at will, and so, are never constrained from
their optima~ consumption plans in any period. With the addition of income
uncertainty and credit rationing, consumers may be prohibited from satisfying
their "desired" consumption plans, and are, as a result, "liquidity constrained".
The policy implications of such liquidity constraints on consumer behavior
have recently come to the attention of researchers, especially with regard to tax
policy analysis [Hubbard and Judd, 1986]. In particular, within the framework of
the LC-PIH, knowledge of the proportion of liquidity constrained consumers
and the fraction of total disposable income controlled by these liquidity
constrained consumers are important components in estimating the
effectiveness of any proposed tax policy changes.
Much empirical work has been devoted to estimating the fraction of
income held by liquidity constrained consumers. Hall and Mishkin [1982] and
Hayashi [1985a], among others, provide evidence on micro data, while Hayashi
[1982], Flavin [1985], and Sterling [1985] are only some of the recent studies
performed on aggregate time series. A common feature of these studies is
that the proportion of income held by liquidity constrained consumers is taken to
be a constant over time [1]. This paper attempts to determine whether this
assertion is theoretically and empirically justified. We sketch a model of
consumer behavior in which the probability that a consumer is liquidity
1
constrained in the sense that his net resources fall below his desired
consumption path is endogenously determined by his preferences,
endowments, and the constraint imposed on his desired borrowings by the
financial sector. Using both the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) and the
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we derive estimates of the
average probability that consumers are liquidity constrained from 1968 to 1982.
We find that the average probability does vary significantly over time with
apparent trend and cyclical components.
The fraction of income which accrues to liquidity constrained consumers,
rather than the proportion of liquidity constrained consumers, has the most
important policy ramifications. Thus, we provide estimates for the fraction of
total income controlled by those consumers who are more likely to be liquidity
constrained.
Finally, we address the issue of the validity of existing tests for liquidity
constraints, the so-called "excess sensitivity tests". We conclude that these
tests suffer from serious endogeneity problems due to their treatment of the
fraction of income controlled by liquidity constrained consumers. They
estimate as a parameter what is, instead, a variable which is endogenous to the
consumer's maximization problem.
The paper is ordered as follows: Section II presents a description of the
procedures used in deriving the estimating model as well as a discussion of the
results on PSIDmicro data. Section III discusses the limitations of existing tests
for liquidity constraints and the conclusions. In addition, an Appendix is included
which gives a more detailed look at the model used in Section II of this study.
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II. EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA
This section is divided broadly into three parts. First, the theoretical
underpinnings of the empirical model will be discussed. In particular, we sketch
the method used in determining the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers.
Also, we discuss the initial application of the derived model to the SCF data set.
In the second part, we outline the procedures employed in combining the results
of the SCF estimation with the available data contained in the PSID. Finally, we
present estimates for both the proportion of liquidity constrained consumers (P)
and the fraction of income controlled by these consumers for the period 1968-
1982.
We assume that consumers maximize expected utility, subject to a
resource constraint and a borrowing constraint. The model used is one
developed by Jappelli [1986]. Income is equal to the sum of a deterministic
component and an agent-specific component, Jlit. Assuming functional forms for
desired consumption and for the borrowing constraint, one can write the
probability that consumer i is liquidity constrained in period t as
(1) Pit = Pr fllit ~ llit*IXt} = F(Xit J3t)
where I3t is a vector of parameters, Xt a matrix of exogenous variables
available in the SCF applicable to all individuals, and F(.) a cumulative
distribution function. The product of X and Pis a reduced form for available
resources - including the amount that the individual is allowed to borrow from
intermediaries - net of desired consumption. The ceiling Jlit* is the level of the
idiosyncratic component of income at which the consumer's desired
consumption and net resources are equat. If Jlit < Jlit*, consumer i is said to be
3
liquidity constrained in period t with probability Pit. The reduced form for Pit is a
function of consumer's behavior, as well as of the nature of the constraint
imposed on the consumer by the financial system.
In the model, each consumer is predicted to have some probability of
being liquidity constrained. This approach stands in contrast to most existing
literature, where consumers are assumed to be either (a) always constrained,
(b) never constrained, or (c) constrained until a certain age and not afterwards,
depending essentially on the timing of their income stream. At an aggregate
level, one may only observe that a certain proportion of individuals are liquidity
constrained. However, the standard approach requires different models of
consumption to describe the behavior of the liquidity constrained consumers
(see Section III below). The framework, instead, provides a setting for studying
both constrained and unconstrained consumers. As we shall see, it also implies
that, in the aggregate, the probabilty of being liquidity constrained is not likely to
stay constant over time.
Candidates for inclusion in the reduced-form vector equation (1) would
be income, net wealth, age, and individual characteristics (education, sex, race,
etc.), as well as the arguments of the borrowing constraint. A relationship such
as equation (1) is intuitively appealing. In a life-eycle context, and with plausible
assumptions about the reduced form for desired consumption and the nature of
the borrowing constraint, one would expect to find a negative relationship
between Pit versus age, income and wealth. Having derived values for Pit
across individuals, we denote the mean of Pit in each year as Pt, i.e. E(Pit) = Pt.
In what follows we assume that the average sample probability of being liquidity
constraint equals the number of consumers which will find themselves
constrained in the period. Thus, we will refer to P as the fraction of liquidity
constrained consumers.
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In a cross-section Ilit is not observable, but one can infer whether Ilit <
Ilit* or Ilit> Ilit* from other data in the SCF. As an operational definition of liquidity
constrained consumers, we follow Jappelli [1986] by using a variable in the SCF
that asked consumers whether they were turned down for credit by financial
institutions. The SCF represents a cross-section data set taken in 1983 which
pertains to 1982. The estimated sample proportion of liquidity constrained
consumers (Le., the proportion for which we assume that Ilit< 1J.it*) from the SCF
was 21 percent. This number is consistent with the 20-25 percent range of
consumers who did not seem to behave in accordance to the standard LC - PIH
reported by King [1985].
Having assumed that liquidity constrained consumers can be observed,
the model represented by (1) can be estimated. The estimation is done in two
steps. To correct for possible measurement errors, a predictive equation for
income is estimated. We assume that the fitted values of the regression
measure normal earnings adjusted for age and cohort effects. The second step
is to conduct a logit estimation with the income estimates serving as one of the
regressors [2].
The logit estimation performed on the SCF produces an estimate of ~, a
vector of parameters that relate the observable variables (income, age, wealth
and individual characteristics) of the SCF to the threshold value Il*. Thus, we
are able to use these coefficients to compute the proportion of liquidity
constrained individuals for years other than that covered by the SCF.
In order to test the proposition of the variability in the proportion of
liquidity constrained consumers, we adopt the SCF parameter estimates for
1982 as the benchmark. Then we perform simulations on the PSID using the
coefficients of the logit model derived from the SCF. In this way, we are able to
determine estimates of Pit, for the years from 1968 to 1982 (waves II through
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XVI of the PSID). By averaging the Pit values in each year, we are also able to
produce estimates of Pt (t= 1968,... , 1982) for years other than 1982. These
values of Pt vary from period to period, and from the benchmark year (1982),
because the underlying variables vary substantially over time.
In order to carry out the above described simulation on the PSID data
set, we match variables in the PSID data set with those used in the SCF. A
description of the variables used in both data sets can be found in the Appendix,
which also reports the values of the estimated coefficients used in the simulation.
All dollar magnitudes are converted to 1982 dollars.
The results of the simulation are presented in Figure 1, where we plot the
average probability of being liquidity constrained derived for 15 PSID waves.
The last observation (1982) refers to wave XVI, the latest available, while the
first (1968) to wave II. This measure of income is derived by using the SCF
income regression coefficients on the PSID data to find a predicted value of real
income. The resulting E(Pit) value is denoted by "P" in Figure 1.
In 1982 the two surveys overlap, and it is encouraging that P is 20.6
percent, while the proportion of liquidity constrained consumers found in the
SCF is 21.7 percent. The difference of only one percentage point is primarily
attributable to different sample characteristics and to the fact that some of the
variables - specifically, the wealth variable - are not fully comparable between
the two data sets [3].
The pattern of the proportion of liquidity constrained consumers is seen
to follow a slightly increasing trend, and, possibly, a pro-cyclical pattern, visible
especially in the first half of the sample period. It is thus apparent that P must be
treated as a variable determined endogenously by demographic characteristics
and economic activity rather than, as in previous studies, as a parameter to be
estimated from time series regressions and/or panel data studies.
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If the fraction of liquidity constrained individuals does vary over time with
cyclical and trend components which depend on variables such as' income,
wealth and age, then the years covered by the PSID provided a good sample for
this proposition. Over this period there were significant peaks and troughs in
the business and income cycles. The swings in P have not been dramatic over
the 15 years of the analysis. However, a t-test for the difference between the
sample means in 1971 and 1982 is highly significant even at the 1 percent level.
We estimate that, from the minimum of 1971, there has been an increase of
approximately 3.5 percentage points in P.
A closer inspection of Figure 1 reveals that until 1973 P remains fairly
stable or declines moderately, after which P increases for the remaini,ng years
of the sample period. There are two reasons that explain this pattern, and they
refer to the two variables which accounts for most of the movement in P,
namely, the evolution of real family income and of the age structure of the
population:
i) according to the PSID survey, average real family income, after rising
until 1973, remained practically constant until the end of the 1970s and then
sharply declined. As a consequence, average real family income at the
beginning of the 1980s was lower by some 7 percentage points than at the end
of the 1960s, and by 16 percent with respect to the 1972-73 period [4].
Changes in family income reflect changes in the level of economic activity, but in
part they may reflect differences in family composition [5].
ii) the age structure of the population, despite the short period of the
sample, also shows a concave pattern during the 1968-1982 period, increasing
until 1972 (from an average of 42.7 years in 1968 to an average of 43.1 in
1972) and decreasing afterwards to an average of 42.0 years in 1982.
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In the logit model estimated on SCF data a decrease of one percentage
point in the average age of the population increases the average P by about two
percentage points. A reduction in real deterministic income of $4,470 in 1982
dollars (as that occurred over the 1973-1982 period) increases P by another
two percentage points. It thus can be seen that the reduction of income and
average household age more than accounts for the increase in P over the
sample period.
In addition to the strong trend component of P, we also find evidence of
cyclical movements in P. As noted above, this is particularly visible in the early
part of the sample period. Employment status and income capture this
component most strongly since they are very sensitive to the level of economic
activity.
A caveat is in order at this point. As noted, the logit coefficients estimated
on the SCF reflect not only consumption behavior, but also the nature of the
constraint imposed by lenders on consumers. In using the estimated
coefficients from the SCF in years other than 1982, we assume that the
parameters of the consumption function, as well as those of the credit
constraint, have stayed constant. While it is very reasonable to assume that
consumption behavior changes very slowly at best, the hypothesis of unchanging
behavior on the part of financial intermediaries can be questioned on several
grounds. First, in times of deregulation, it is likely that higher competition
among intermediaries would lead to an easiness of the constraint that
consumers face, and to a decrease of P. Second, financial innovations may
also be reflected in the abillty of the intermediaries to process loans, and in the
reduction of the costs of gathering information. Thus, innovations may also have
contributed to decrease P. As an indicator of changed behavior of
intermediaries, it is sufficient to note that consumer debt in recent years has
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increased very substantially, from 0.58 percent of personal disposable income
in 1975 to more than 70 percent at the end of 1984 [Paquette, 1986].
Since the model implicitly assumes that the financial market structure in
1982 (the year to which the SCF data set pertains) holds throughout the sample
period, it is likely that this simulation underestimates the proportion of liquidity
constrained consumers before 1982. Unfortunately, given the nature of the
PSID survey and the operational definition of liquidity constraints that we have
adopted in the SCF survey, we have found no satisfactory way of incorporating
"supply side" effects in the analysis. For this reason, the estimate of P that we
provide should be taken as merely indicative of its true value. More generally,
this exercise is only meant to provide an example of how the changing behavior
of P over time could be studied, and can not account for all sources of variation
that might have potentially affected P in recent years.
With these qualifications in mind, and having obtained an estimate of P, it
is a simple task to compute the value of L, the fraction of income that accrues to
consumers who are likely to be liquidity constrained. For this purpose we
compute the average income of the consumers with Pit > E(Pit) for
t=1968,... ,1982, i.e. the average income of those consumers that are on
average more likely to be liquidity constrained. We denote this average as YCt.
The variable Lt is then computed as (Yct!YNdPt, where YNt is the average
income of the sample population in year t. The results of the computation are
also reported in Figure 1 (line "L"). The values of Lt that we generate increase
from a minimum of 12.6 percent in 1968 to a maximum of 14.9 percent in 1982.
These values are similar to the estimates of the fraction of income that accrues
to liquidity constrained consumers provided on panel data by Hall and Mishkin
[1982] - 20 percent for the United States - and Hayashi [1985a] - 16 percent
for Japan.
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As expected, L is lower than P, as constrained consumers tend to control
a lesser fraction of total income than do unconstrained consumers. It is also
apparent that L tracks P very closely. The swing of L is less pronounced than
that of P (about two percentage points from the minimum of 1968 to the
maximum of 1982), but the ratio of L to P is roughly constant at 68 percent
indicating that the income distribution between constrained and unconstrained
consumers has not changed dramatically over the sample period. It is
apparent, however, from Figure 1 that the movements in L are more volatile as
compared to those of P. This is not surprising since one would expect L to be
more sensitive to changes in the level of economic activity than would P. As a
final note on the plausibility of the results, one can compare them with the above
discussed existing empirical evidence, as well as with the theoretical simulation
provided by Hubbard and Judd [1986] who, in a nonstochastic environment
predict P =23.5 percent, and L =14.9 percent [6]. This study provides
substantial empirical evidence broadly consistent with their estimates.
Moreover, we show that both P and L have exhibited an increasing trend during
the 1970s and early 1980s as well as a slightly cyclical component. More
generally, this exercise shows that it may be incorrect to estimate L as a fixed
parameter from time series regressions, since L is an endogenous variable,
i.e., a variable which moves over time as a function of other variables such as
income and age. In the next Section we examine the implications of this study
for the existing tests of liquidity constraints, and state the conclusions.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING TESTS OF LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS
This section discusses the most common tests for liquidity constrained.
These tests try to determine whether consumption is "too" sensitive to
anticipated current income than implied by the LC-PIH cum rational
expectations model. One test has been presented by Hall and Mishkin [1982] in
the context of a panel study. Hall and Mishkin assume the existence of two
groups of consumers, those following the rational expectations-lifecycle model,
and the Keynesians consumers. The first group of consumers is assumed to
solve an intertemporal maximization problem, in the absence of any constraint
besides one that expenditure over the lifetime cannot exceed lifetime resources.
By further assuming rational expectations, Hall [1978] shows that, with quadratic
utility function and constant interest rate, the Euler equation for the
unconstrained consumer is
(2) Cu =Po + P1 CU-1 + V
where Cu represents consumption by the unconstrained consumers, and v is
an error term incorrelated with any information available to the consumer in the
current period. The second group of consumers is assumed to be liquidity
constrained, and to consume its entire current disposable income
(3) Cc=Yo
where Cc is the amount consumed by the constrained consumer. Aggregate
consumption is given by
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(4) C=Cu + Cc =Cu+ LYO + v
where L is the fraction of total disposable income held by constrained
consumers. By combining (2) and (4), C can be rewritten as
Equation (5) can be estimated by a non-linear two-stage instrumental
variables procedure. A more common approach in the literature is to assume a
time-series specification for the process generating Yo to substitute in (5), and
perform system estimation with cross-equation restrictions. Since (5) involves
consumption at two points in time, an estimate of the fraction of liquidity
constrained consumers L can only be obtained by using aggregate time-series
data, or individual panel data. Indeed, this is the basic approach followed by
Hayashi [1982], Summers and Delong [1984], Flavin [1985], and Sterling [1985]
on United States time-series macro data, and by Hall and Mishkin [1982], and
Altonji and Siow [1986] on the PSID annual survey. A recent paper by Hayashi
[1985b] provides an excellent survey of current tests for liquidity constrained
consumers.
All of these studies assume a constant value of L over time, but, in light of
the discussion in Section II, the estimated equations are likey to suffer from
serious endogeneity problems. We have in fact shown that L is not a parameter
to be estimated but, rather, an endogenous variable. It results from the
combination of P, and of the distribution of income among constrained and
unconstrained consumers. The variable P itself is the outcome of the
maximizing behavior of consumers, of the nature of the constraint imposed on
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consumers by the banking sector, and of the individual shocks to income in each
period. In essence, L can be written as
(6) L =L(Z)
where Z represents the set of aggregate variables which explain the evolution
of L, including wealth, income, age, the parameters of the income distribution.
We cannot, however, simply substitute (6) into (5) and estimate a variable
parameter model since L(Z) is derived from a model which is fundamentally
different than the model which produces (5). In contrast to previous studies, we
do not posit "a priori" the existence of two groups of consumers in the economy
- constrained and unconstrained consumers. Rather, we model only one type
of consumer who has some non-zero probability of being liquidity constrained.
We may identify the differences between this model and that which constitutes
the bulk of previous studies as:
i) existing tests assume two groups of consumers in the population. This
assumption seems to be overly ad hoc, especially for the group of Keynesian
consumers. We assume only one;
ii) in this model consumers ("ex ante") are constrained only in a
stochastic sense. Only "ex post" there will be a fraction of the population that is
liquidity constrained;
iii) the probability of being liquidity constrained is an endogenous variable
in this study, and so, both the proportion of the population that is liquidity
constrained and the fraction of total income which is controlled by constrained
consumers are also endogenous.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
In general, the results for tests of liquidity constrained consumers are
very mixed. However, as Hayashi [1985b] reports, estimates of L using panel
data are usually more stable, precise, and uniform than are time-series
estimates. The point estimates of L are broadly consistent with those of Hall and
Mishkin [1982]. This may be reconciled by noting that the sample periods are
relatively short, and that L problably does not vary widely in the short term.
Although the estimates do vary significantly over time, they are indeed fairly
stable.
In sum, we have shown using panel data that the proper treatment of L
(and P) involves the modelling of them as endogenous variables, rather than as
constant parameters, over time. This result has important ramifications for
policy-makers. In this context, deficit financing will have multiplier effects, the
magnitude of which depends importantly on the value of L and on its behavior
over time. For example, the procyclical behavior of L implies that fiscal policy is
more effective at those times when it is more needed, Le. during recessions.
This study has identified what we believe to be a serious oversight of the
literature on tests for liquidity constrained, and one which should be considered
in tuture work.
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APPENDIX
The purpose of the Appendix is to describe the method that we use in
computing Pit, the probability that consumer i is liquidity constrained in period t.
We start by estimating a legit model using as dependent variable a qualitative
variable contained in the 1983 SCF. The variable reports whether consumers
were turned down by financial institutions and whether they felt that, if they
applied for credit, they would have been turned down. The variables in the SCF
refer to 1982, and are therefore comparable with wave XVI of the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics. The estimated logit model [Jappelli, 1986] is
In [Pi / (1 - In Pi)] =-.0099 Y AGE -.02 WEALTH + .136 AGE - .00099 AGE2 -
.56 HOWN -.20 RACE - .18 NE -.43 NC - .21 SO - .35 AD - .02
where income Y is computed from the regression
Y = .035 AGE - .0004 AGE2 + .01 WEALTH + .267 EMP + .672 EWORK +
.129 SEX + .065 EDUC + .092 FSIZE + 6.92
The variables age, homeownership (HOWN =1 if homeowner), race
(RACE =1 if white) , sex (SEX =1 if male) , employment status (EMP =1 if
employed), EWORK (=1 if employed and expects to work), education (EDUC =
numbers of years of education), family size (FSIZE), and the regional dummies
(NE, NC, SO and AD =1 if living .in the North-East, in the North-eentral, in the
South and in rural areas, respectively) can be found in both the SCF and in the
PSID and are fully comparable in the two surveys. All variables, except wealth
in the logit equation, are significant at least at the 5 percent level.
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The variable Y is "family gross income from all sources earned in 1982"
in the SCF and "total family money income" in the PSID survey. The only
variable which is not fully comparable between the SCF and the PSID is the
aggregate of family net wealth. The SCF gives in fact a detailed description of
individual wealth, inclusive of financial assets, property and debt. The PSID,
instead, only reports the value of the house and gives no indication of debt or
financial wealth. This would seriously bias the estimates in that, if we use the
PSID wealth series, we would not only underestimate individual wealth but also
attribute a value of zero wealth to non-homeowning consumers. To overcome
this bias, we proceed to correct the wealth variable by adding to each consumer
one half of the average value of the house of each PSID wave. The value of 1/2
is derived from the SCF, where it appears that total net wealth is on average
roughly 3/2 of the value of the house.
Conforming to what done in estimating the legit model in the SCF, we
exclude observations relative to individuals who do not report their age as well
as those who do not report their income. Each probability presented in Figure
1 is the average of more than 6,000 observations of each PSID wave. We use
the deflator of private consumption to convert income and wealth in 1982
constant dollars.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Cross-section studies ostensibly would not need to make this assumption
since time is not a component of the analysis. However, if the estimate is to have
any relevance bejond the time period at which the cross-section was taken, one
would need to assume that the estimate is constant over time.
2. See the Appendix for exposition of the regression equations used, and for
further discussion of the model.
3. See the Appendix for a description of the difference between the definition of
wealth in the two surveys, and for the approximation that we have used to match
the two variables.
4. The average real total family income, expressed in 1982 dollars, was $24,265
in 1968-69, climbed to a maximum of $27,185 in 1972-73 and reached a
minimum of $22,715 in 1981-82. Similar results are obtained when one
compares the 1970 Survey of Consumer Finances with the 1977 Consumer
Credit Survey and the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances [Federal Reserve
Bullettin, 1984, pp. 680-1].
5. An increase in the number of families consisting of unmarried people
(including single person families) contributed to a decrease in average family
size between 1973 and 1982 and may have reduced average real family
income. According to the PSID, average family size was 4.36 in 1973 and
declined to 2.84 in 1982.
6. These values can be found in Hubbard and Judd [1986] Table 3. They are
generated by assuming an isoelastic utility function, with an elasticity of
substitution in consumption of 0.10, a rate of time preference of 0.015, and the
constraint that net worth must be nonnegative.
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LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT VOLATILITY:
Evidence from Post-War U.S. Aggregate Data
Abstract
The "Life Cycle - Permanent Income Hypothesis" posits the existence of a
consumer who chooses a consumption level in each period so as to maxim,ize
expected lifetime utility. Credit markets are assumed to be perfect so that the
consumer may lend and borrow freely. In the absence of such credit markets,
consumers may find themselves unable to satisfy their desired consumption
plans, and so, are said to be "liquidity constrained". Using post-war U.S.
aggregate time-series data, the extent and volatility of such credit market
constraints are examined.
1. INTRODUCTION
The "Life Cycle - Permanent Income Hypothesis" (LC-PIH) maintains that
rational, forward-looking individuals smooth consumption over their lifetime,
constrained only by expected lifetime income endowments. It is typically
assumed that capital markets are perfect so that these individuals may lend and
borrow at will in order to achieve their desired consumption pattern, and so,
are never constrained in any period. Recent studies, using both micro data
and aggregate time-series data, have investigated the degree to which the LC-
PIH characterizes the consumption behavior of individuals in an economy, and
have found evidence which supports the existence of individuals who are unable
to satisfy their desired consumption plans, and so, are said to be "liquidity
constrained".1
The existence of liquidity constraints on consumers' behavior has
important implications for economic policy. The effectiveness of tax policy
changes and government expenditure programs would be particularly
influenced by the fraction of total income held by liquidity constrained consumers
in the economy. Hence, the precise measurement of these phenomena would
be valuable for policymakers in formulating policy actions.
A common feature of previous studies on liquidity constrained behavior
has been to treat the economy's fraction of liquidity constrained consumers as a
constant over time. Using an instrumental variable technique on U.S. aggregate
data from 1953:1 to 1985:4, Mankiw and Campbell [1987] estimate the fraction of
liquidity constrained consumers (A) to be between 0.35 to 0.65 depending on the
1See Hall and Mishkin [1982] and Hayashi [1985] for micro data-based studies. Hayashi [1982],
Flavin [1985], and Summers and Delong [1984] present studies using aggregate time-series
data.
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particular instruments used. Hayashi [1982] also used an instrumental variable
technique on annual U.S. data from 1948 to 1978 and obtained an estimate of A.
equal to 0.892. Finally, Hall and Mishkin [1982], using U.S. panel data (the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics) estimated A. as 0.20 over the 1969 - 1975 sample
period. These studies, as well as those done by Flavin [1981 , 1985] and
Summers and Delong [1984], conclude that the lC-PIH consumption behavior
does apply to a large portion of the consumers in the U.S. economy. However,
the magnitude of this deviation from the lC-PIH varies according to the sample
period and the estimation technique.
Economic theory suggests that A. should be sensitive to economic and
demographic variables, and thus should be treated as endogenously varying
over time. Using micro data ( the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics data sets), Fissel and Jappelli [1986] found that the
average fraction of total income controlled by liquidity constrained consumers
does vary significantly from 1968 to 1982. Fissel and Jappelli found that A.
ranged from 0.126 in 1968 to 0.149 in 1982. Although not large, the movement
in A. is statistically significant. This paper extends this earlier work by examining
the volatility of A. over time using post-war U.S. aggregate time-series data. An
examination of the endogenous movement in the fraction of liquidity constrained
consumers is better handled with aggregate time-series data as compared to
micro data simply due to the breadth of the available data. Moreover, the use of
micro data (see Fissel and Jappelli [1986]) requires that simulations be
performed to estimate the value of A. over time. In contrast, the use of
aggregate time-series data allows one to use the current realizations of the
necessary data in order to estimate the evolution of A..
Consistent with the Fissel and Jappelli study using panel data, this study
finds that the endogenous specification of A. significantly improves the fit of the
2
consumption equation vis-a-vis that resulting from a parametric specification of
A. Moreover, the movement of A over the sample period (1954:1 - 1985:4) is
statistically significant. These results support the assertion that A is properly
modelled as endogenous. The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows.
Section 2 presents the theoretical model, based on Hall's [1978] study. Section
3 discusses the filtering of the endogenous variables of the model, derives the
estimable system of equations, and discusses the Full-Information Maximum
Likelihood estimation procedure. Section 4 presents the results of the study and
Section 5 offers some conclusions.
2. MODEL
Following the model developed by Hall [1978], it is assumed that, at any
point in time, there exist two types of consumers in the economy - (i) liquidity
constrained and (ii) unconstrained consumers. Formally, liquidity constrained
consumers must devote all of their current disposable income to current
consumption:
3
(1 ) ... L ... Lct = yt
where the" ... " signifies "per capita" variables, c~ represents consumption by a
representative liquidity constrained consumer in period t, and y~ is the
disposable income of a representative liquidity constrained consumer in period
t.
The unconstrained consumer, by definition, can lend and borrow
freely, and is assumed to choose his consumption level so as to maximize
expected utility over his lifetime:
T
V = max Eo L (1 +5)- t U(C~)
t=O
subject to At+1 =(1+r) (At + Y~ - c~ )
where
U(.) == one-period utility function for the unconstrained consumer,
assumed to be additively separable through time;
B == subjective rate of time preference;
r == real rate of interest, assumed constant over time (r ~ B);
Ct == consumption;
Yt == income;
At == non-human assets.
The necessary 1st-order condition for utility maximization is:
Thus, for the unconstrained consumer, equation (2) relates the marginal utility
of consumption in period (t+1) to the marginal utililty of consumption in period t.
Assuming a quadratic one-period utility function:
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where C is the bliss consumption point, consumption for the unconstrained
consumer in period t can be represented as:
(3) _U b b - U -c t = 0 + 1 Ct-1 + Ut
h b c(r - B) b (1+B) - U . t' f .were 0 (1 + r)' 1 = (1 +r) , c t IS consump Ion 0 a representative
unconstrained consumer in period t, and Ot is a "white noise" disturbance term.
Equation (3) states that, for the unconstrained consumer, no information
available in period t apart from c~ can help predict consumption in period t+1
(C~1)' Hall [1978] maintains that equation (3) is a close approximation to the
stochastic behavior of unconstrained consumption under the LC-PIH.
Since aggregate time-series data are used, the aggregated analogues to
equations (1) and (3) are:
(4)
(5)
where A is the fraction of disposable income held by liquidity constrained
consumers, and Yt is aggregate disposable income in period t. Total
consumption in period t may then be written as:
(6)
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Since Ct~1 = Ct-1 - A, Yt-1, equation (6) can be rewritten as:
Ct = 130 + 131 (Ct-1 - A, Yt-1) + A, Yt + at
(7) Ct = 130 + 131 Ct-1 + A, [Vt - 131 Yt-1 ] + et
Assuming that disposable income may be adequately modelled as an AR(p)
process:
(8) Yt = PO + P1 Vt-1 + P2 Yt-2 + ... + Pp Yt-p + Vt
one has a system of two estimable equations which include the time-series
process of disposable income (8) and the aggregate consumption function (7).
The liquidity constraint value in equation (7) - A, - can be thought of as a shadow
price on current consumption which functions as an interest rate. Whereas the
unconstrained consumer can maintain normal consumption levels during
periods of abnormally low income by dissaving and borrowing, the liquidity
constrained consumer will reduce current consumption as if he faced a higher
interest rate.2
2See Hall [1987], p.18.
As noted above, previous work has treated Aas a constant to be
estimated within this system of equations. Fissel and Jappelli [1986] show, using
panel data, that Ashould be modelled as endogenous, subject to other economic
and demographic factors which determine its value. In this paper, I extend this
insight into the context of aggregate time-series estimation. The endogeneity of
Acan be represented as:
where 2t is a vector of explanatory variables for the liquidity constraint variable.
Two systems can now be estimated. One system will consist of equations (7)
and (8) in which A is treated as fixed (the "Constant Parameter" (CP) system, or
Ao). The other system includes equations (7), (8) and (9) where A is determined
by other macroeconomic and demographic variables (the "Endogenous
Variable" (EV) system, or At).
3. ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
A. The Filtering of the Time-Series Data
This section presents the method by which the consumption and income
series are filtered prior to estimation. Although frequently overlooked, the
appropriate filtering of the time-series data is important. The aim is to employ a
filter which transforms a nonstationary series into one which is sufficiently
"whitened" so as to avoid any spurious correlations in the aggregate time-
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series data.3 This is a stronger requirement than just making the series
stationary. A stochastic process is called stationary if the first two moments of
the joint distributions of the finite subsequences are finite and do not change
through time. Stationarity is an important property as it guarantees that there
are no fundamental changes in the structure of the process that would render
estimation difficult or impossible. However, a stationary process does not
necessarily eliminate correlations in the data which could lead to spurious
causality inferences from the estimation. These correlations are generally due
to common factors, such as time, which have nothing to do with causality. It is
this insight which leads Sims [1972] to filter the time series in order to flatten the
spectral density.
According to Nelson and Plosser [1982], models based on time trend
residuals may be misspecified if the secular movement in the time-series is of a
stochastic rather than deterministic nature. This is fundamentally a question of
the appropriate characterization of nonstationarity in economic time-series. A
"trend7 stationary" series (Le., "detrending" a time-series by regression on a
time trend) implies a deterministic time trend, while a "differenced" process
implies a stochastic time trend, where it is generally assumed that the secular
trend component is the source of the nonstationarity in the series (Le., the
cyclical component is stationary). Nelson and Plosser present evidence which
supports the latter (stochastic trend) representation over the former
(deterministic trend). Moreover, one must have some way of testing whether
the filtered data is sufficiently "whitened". As noted above, a filter which renders
a series stationary is not guaranteed to render it a "white noise" process.
3 A "white noise" process is one which is serially uncorrelated, and so, a "whitened" variable is
one which is passed through a filter to make it a "white noise".
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Nelson and Plosser give an example of a first difference filter which may make a
series stationary, but does not remove a stochastic secular trend in the data.
The results in this paper are consistent with their findings.
Before discussing the statistical results of various filters, a brief mention
of the specification of the data is necessary. As noted by Mankiw and Campbell
[1987], aggregate time-series data on consumption and income are more
closely represented as log-linear processes than linear processes, since the
mean change and the innovation variance grow with the level of the series.
Hence, the scaling of these variables is necessary. The scaling strategy
employed in this paper is to transform all variables to logarithmic form.
Spectral analysis is used to test for the "whitening" of the relevant time-
series data. The frequency domain is able to expose aspects of the data not so
readily available at the observation intervals of the time domain, especially
trends and seasonality. The power spectra of the time-series data are
computed and graphed. In general, the presence of a trend in the data is
consistent with a large value for the spectral density function at a zero
frequency (or an infinitely long period since trends do not repeat). Beyond the
visual analysis of the power spectra, Durbin's Cumulated Periodogram test (see
Durbin [1969]) is employed to test the "goodness-of-fit" of the filtered series
against a theoretical "white noise" process, which has a constant spectral
density value over the entire range. The maximum vertical distance between
the two distributions yields a Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic which can be used
for testing of the "whitened" series against the null hypothesis of "white noise".
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics from Durbin's Cumulated Periodogram test
are reported in Table 1, as applied to quarterly data over the 1947:1 - 1987:1
interval (a total of 164 observations).
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Filter
Income
No Filter
Linear Trend
Quadratic Trend
Cubic Trend
4th Difference
1st Difference
1st -4th Differencea
Consumption
No Filter
1st Difference
1st -4th Ditterencea
Table 1
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic
0.94942
0.40132
0.37740
0.35372
0.67456
0.34088
0.06771
0.94962
0.61153
0.09376
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a: A first and fourth difference filter, Le., the fourth difference of the first differences of the series.
The critical values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics are4
900k Confidence Level: 0.1347
95% Confidence Level: 0.1502
99% Confidence Level: 0.1800
4 The critical values are derived from the following formulas (for a "one-sample" test):
90% Confidence Level: 1.22rrm
95% Confidence Level: 1.36rrm
99% Confidence Level: 1.63rrm
where m = (n/2) = 82 (See Winkler and Hays [1975], p. 845-848).
The hypothesis test posits the "white noise" process as the null hypothesis. If the
tabulated Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is greater than the critical Kolmogorov-
Smirnov value, then the null hypothesis is rejected and the filtered process is
statistically distinguishable from a "white noise" process. Looking at the income
series, none of the time trend filters (linear, quadratic, or cubic) is able to
reduce the income series to a "white noise" process. In addition, neither the
first difference or fourth difference filters sufficiently "whiten" the income series.
Only the first -fourth difference filter statistically "whitens" the income series.
The latter result is consistent with the Nelson and Plosser [1982] result that first
differencing does not eliminate a stochastic trend from the series. The
consumption series follows the same pattern as the income series. Again, the
first difference filter does not sufficiently "whiten" the series, while the first -
fourth difference filter does so. The first -fourth difference filter is thus used in
this paper for both the income and consumption series. The power spectra for
the first and first-fourth difference filters of the income and consumption series
considered in Table 1 are presented in Figures 1 - 4.5 The power spectra for
the remaining filters of the income series are presented in Appendix A.
5 The "period" is given by: period = [168/entry number],while the frequency is given by :
frequency = ["entry number"/168]. In addition, the spectra are computed using a window length
(Parzen) of 11 (w11). The window makes the estimates smoother, and so, reduces the
variance of the spectral estimate (greater efficiency) while introducing some bias in the spectral
density estimate.
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The evidence of a trend, as indicated by a large spectral density at the zero
frequency (zero entry number), is removed by the first - fourth difference filter,
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but remains for the first difference filter and for the time trend filters. The first
- fourth difference filtered income and consumption series (in logs) are shown
in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. Figures 5 and 6 are the time domain
analogues of Figures 2 and 4 which present the series in the frequency domain.
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B. Full-Information Maximum Likelihood Estimation
A Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation technique is
chosen to estimate the system of two simultaneous equations. Consider the
following 2-equation nonlinear system:
(10) Yt = f(Xt. fJ) + Ut
where
Yt = .(y; y~)' == vector of endogenous variables;
Xt = (X; ~)' == matrix of regressors;
p = (~1 ~2)' == vector of unknown parameters;
1 2
Ut = (u. ut )' == vector of error terms.
The model (10) is estimated under the normality assumption of Ut, i.e.,
Ut - N (0,1:)
Amemiya [1977] has shown that the FIML estimator is consistent if the true
distribution of Ut is normal, but is, in general, inconsistent if Ut is not normal.
However, the FIML estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the non-linear
three-stage estimator if ut is normally distributed.
Amemiya [1983] and Engle [1984] have shown that the likelihood ratio test
(LRT) is a proper test statistic for this hypothesis-testing problem:
(11) LRT = 2 [ log L(~) - log L(~)] - X2(q)
where L(~) is the log-likelihood for the unconstrained system, L(~) is the log-
likelihood for the constrained system and q is the number of parameter
restrictions. Under the null hypothesis that the constraints are appropriate, the
LRT statistic has a chi-squared distribution with q degrees of freedom. With the
FIML technique; one can use a likelihood-ratio test statistic to determine
16
whether the advantage gained by modelling Aas an endogenous variable is
statistically significant. The estimated parameters in the EV system can be used
to track the movement in the fraction of income controlled by liquidity
constrained consumers (Ad over the sample period (1954:1 -1985:4).
Filtered income can be adequately modelled as an AR(4) process. This is
statistically verified since spectral analysis of the residuals of this income
generating process reveals that the residuals are "white noise". The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic derived from Durbin's Cumulative Periodogram
test for the residuals of this AR(4) process is 0.065. As noted earlier, this value
falls below the 90% confidence level, and so, the residuals are not significantly
different from a "white noise" process. The estimated system is then:
(12) Yt = no + a1 Yt-1 + a2 Yt-2 + a3 Yt-3 + <X4 Yt-4 + Vt
(13) Ct =130 + 131 Ct-1 + A (ao + (a1 - ~1 )Yt-1
+ a2 Yt-2 + a3 Yt-3 + <X4 Yt-4) + et
The EV system, where the liquidity constraint parameter - At - is modelled as a
value which evolves over time and is determined by other aggregate time-
series variables, is tested against the standard assumption (the CP system)
which treats the liquidity constraint parameter as a constant - A.a. Formally, the
alternative specifications for Aare:
17
(14)
(15)
CP:
EV
A. = A.o = go
A = At = go + g1 • urt + g2· aget + g3· drt + g4· ict
where urt == log of unemployment rate;
age. == log of the ratio of the number of people in the 20-35 age
category to the number of people in the 40-55 age category;
drt == log of the delinquency rate on consumer installment loans,
30 days or more;
iCt == log of the ratio of consumer installment loans to personal income.
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The variables used to determine the evolution of At are aggregate
economic, demographic and financial variables. The unemployment rate, which
was used by Flavin [1985], proxies for the cyclical movement in economic activity
in the U.S. economy over the sample period. The ratio of the number of
consumers in the 20 - 35 age category to the number of consumers in the 40 -
55 age category is used to identify the relative age distribution of the U.S.
population. Consistent with the Life Cycle hypothesis, this variable measures the
relative number of consumers in the low-earning period of their lives to the
number of consumers in the high-earning period of their lives. Two financial
variables are also included - the delinquency rate of thirty days or more on
consumer installment loans and the ratio of consumer installment credit to
personal income. They are meant to capture the degree of credit market
"tightness", as well as the general trend of credit market expansion over the
sample period. The explanatory variables of At are presented in Figure 7.
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3.0 FIGURE 7: Explanatory variables of A.
dr
Ie
ur
1976 1981 1986
date
197119661956 1961
0.0 -+-~-r-~--r-~--r----,r---r---r-....--.......--r--.----r--~~
1946 1951
1.0
2.0
4. RESULTS
The two equation system (equations (12) and (13) ) was estimated
simultaneously using a Full Information Maximum Likelihood technique while
imposing the various specifications for A: equation (14) for the CP system and
equation (15) for the EV system. The sample period was from 1954:1 through
1985:4. The beginning of the sample period was chosen to avoid the Korean
War which, as shown by Mankiw and Campbell [1987], has serious effects on
the estimated liquidity constraint values. Table 2 contains the parameter
estimates for the CP and EV systems.6
6 As noted below, 1980:1 - :2 was a period in which the government placed controls on the
credit markets. The removal of these two quarters from the sample failed to improve the fit of
the model.
Table 2a
Coefficient CP EV
90 0.356 1.65
(4.91 ) (1.47)
g1 -0.27
(-0.53)
g2 -0.22
(-0.29)
93 1.03
(1.22)
94 -0.64
(-1.34)
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Log-Likelihood
R2: Consumption Eqn.
1183.0
0.67
1226.4
0.76
a: ''I-statistics'' are reported parenthetically.
The coefficients on the unemployment rate (g1) and on the age
distribution (g2) are not individually significant and have signs which are the
opposite of that which is expected. One would expect the coefficients on the
unemployment rate and the ratio of the number of consumers in their low-
earning years to the number of consumers in their high-earning years to be
positive, Le., increases in these variables should raise At. The former result is
in contrast to the finding of Flavin [1985]. Flavin uses the unemployment rate as
a proxy for the severity and prevalence of liquidity constraints on consumption
and finds that the excess sensitivity of consumption to the unemployment rate is
negative.7 Of greater interest are the coefficient estimates of the delinquency
rate (g3) and the ratio of installment credit to personal income (g4) which reflect
the credit market conditions over the sample period. In addition, the
delinquency rate reflects the level of economic activity in the economy. The
coefficient on the delinquency rate is positive, as expected, and is marginally
significant at the 80% confidence level. A greater delinquency rate on
installment credit implies riskier behavior by lending institutions as well as
decreased economic activity. The coefficient on the ratio of installment credit to
personal income, which is a measure of credit market tightness, has the
expected negative sign and is significant at the 80% confidence level. A greater
ratio of installment credit implies greater credit availability in the economy.
The joint significance of the variables which explain the evolution of A.t can
be determined by using the Likelihood Ratio Test as presented in Table 3.
7 The perverse signs on the unemployment rate and the age distribution coefficients may be due
to the collinearity of these variables. Estimating the EV system without "dr" (the delinquency
rate) renders a positive (but insignificant) sign for the coefficient on the age distribution;
however, the sign for the coefficient on the unemployment rate remains negative. In addition,
using one and two period lags on the unemployment rate yield negative and insignificant signs on
their coefficients.
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Table 3: Hypothesis Test of the EV system versus the CP system
HO: 91 =92 =93 =94 =°
Ha: 91 ~ 0, 92 ~ 0, 93 ~ 0, 94 ~ 0.
LRT statistic =86.8 ~ reject Ho.
a: The chi-squared critical value (with a probability of 0.005 that a value beyond that critical
value would be realized) for the EV system versus the CP system is: X2 (4) = 14.86.
Usin9 equation (11), the LRT statistic is 86.8, which is well above the
critical value of 14.86. Thus, the null hypothesis, that the CP system performs
as well as the EV in explainin9 consumption behavior is soundly rejected
statistically. With the EV system statistically supported, the fitted values of At
are derived using equation (15) over the sample period of 1954:1 - 1985:4.
Figure 8 plots the values of At (the EV system) and Ao (the CP system).
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The At estimates vary a great deal over the sample period. The Likelihood Ratio
Test is sufficient to show that the movement in At is statistically significant at the
99% confidence level. They reach a maximum value of 0.56 in 1954:1 (the first
period of the sample) and approach zero in the 1983:3 - 1984:1 period. The
range of these estimates is consistent with those values of AD derived in
previous studies. Figure 9 plots the 90% confidence band around the At
estimates. This indicates the degree of precision of the EV system estimates.8
In addition, a 900/0 confidence band around the At estimates' "in-sample" mean
(E(At) =0.21) is shown in Figure 10, with a standard deviation of 0.109. In sum,
it is clear that the endogenous specification of A significantly improves the fit of
the consumption equation and that its volatility is significant as well.
8 Since At is theoretically bounded between zero and one by definition, the At estimates below
zero but within the 900/0 confidence band are not economically meaningful.
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In broad terms, the fraction of income which is controlled by liquidity
constrained consumers is determined by both the supply of and demand for
credit in financial markets. The former is primarily conditioned by the monetary
and regulatory actions of the Federal Reserve as well as by commercial bank
behavior, while the latter is due to the saving and consumption decisions of
individuals in the economy. The explanatory variables of A.t (for the EV system)
link the policy activity of the financial market regulators and the general level of
economic activity to the severity of liquidity constraints in the economy. The
expansion and the coincident deregulation of credit markets can explain the
general upward drift inthe ratio of consumer installment loans to personal
income (ic) over the sample period (see Figure 7). This is particularly evident in
the 1950's, the early 1960's, and the mid-1980's. Beyond this longer term
trend, "ic" is sensitive to the particular monetry - credit market regimes. For
example, during the period of monetary - credit restraint in the mid-1970's and
the capital controls of the first two quarters of 1980, "ic" decreased noticeably.
The delinquency rate on consumer installment loans (dr) reflects, in part, the
level of economic activity by gauging consumers' ability to repay debt, as well as
reflecting the behavior of financial institutions regarding the riskiness of their
loan activity. Tighter credit markets and a greater vigilance by financial
institutions in the screening of loans tend to lower "dr", while a lower level of
economic activity will diminish consumers' ability to service their debt, and so,
tend to increase "dr".
For the most part, the movement in At over the sample period is
consistent with the developments in the credit markets and the macroeconomy.
At decreased from 56.4% to 22.6% over the 1954:1 to 1955:4 period. The rise
in consumer expenditures relative to disposable income over this period was
facilitated by a record expansion of credit, where this credit liberalization ended
during 1955 as the credit markets tightened and commercial banks screened
loans more carefully. The At value stabilized between between 25% and 20%
over the following three years, including the 1957 - early 1958 recessionary
period. The economic upturn in late 1958 and 1959 saw a record rate of bank
lending, and so, a decrease in At of 8%. A 10% increase in At occurred during
1959:4 and leveled off over the next two years in the face of an increased saving
rate by consumers, characterized by a larger accumulation of liquid assets and
a more restricted use of credit. A period of economic expansion typified the
1962 - 1965 period with a slight downward movement in At. Over this period,
monetary policy supported an expansionary fiscal policy by maintaining a ready
availability of credit, thus accomodating an expansion of demand at relatively
stable interest rates. During this period, there were significant changes in the
character of financial instruments and in the behavior of financial institutions. In
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particular, new money market instruments such as the negotiable certificates of
deposit (CD's) and the upward revisions in the maximum interest rates allowed
to be paid on time and savings deposits enabled commercial banks to attract
large inflows of such deposits. These changes allowed for a rapid increase in
bank credit. Individuals were able to simultaneously increase both their
borrowing and their holdings of liquid financial assets. The value of At ranged
from a 9.7% low in 1964:2 to a 200/0 high in 1965:3. A credit squeeze occurred
in 1966 as the Federal Reserve sought to curb the growth of credit in the face of
the extraordinary rise in credit demands in late 1965. This is reflected by an
upward movement in At of 6.70/0 from 1966:1 to 1967:1. Expansionary monetary
policy (Le., credit easing) in 1967 replaced the more restrictive policy of the
previous year. At reaches a trough in 1968:3 of 10.6%. This was followed by a
9.7% increase in At from 1968:3 to 1970:1 during a period of monetary restraint
and unusually high credit demand (caused by a high level of economic activity
and high inflation expectations). At reached a trough in 1972:1 of 5% (the lowest
At value for the 1970's) as monetary authorities followed a program of monetary
easing. Credit markets tightened over the 1972 - 1975 period as higher
inflation and a recessionary downturn were reflected in credit markets. A
liquidity squeeze occurred during this period as banks were confronted with an
inablitity to expand deposits and absorb drains on their reserves. The value of
At peaked in 1974:3 at 43.7%. The general decline in At over 1975 - 1978
period coincided with a general decline in economic activity, presumably due to
a decrease in credit demand. Monetary restraint was instituted in 1979 to
check inflation by limiting money and credit growth. Moreover, credit controls
were put in place during the first two quarters of 1980. Hence, there was a
corresponding increase in At from 21.9% in 1979:1 to a peak of 41.0% in
1980:3. Following the lifting of credit controls in 1980:3 and a postwar record
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rate of monetary growth in the second half of 1980, At began a continuous
downward path, reaching a trough below 5% in 1984. Monetary restraint
returned in 1981 in an effort to curb inflation, during which the U.S. experienced
a recession which lasted to November 1982. Economic expansion occurred
subsequently, lasting for the remainder of the sample period. The 1980's have
witnessed many changes in the institutional structure of credit markets which
have enhanced the ability of financial institutions to attract funds while
maintaining the stability of financial markets. Two important examples are the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Among other provisions,
the former mandated the phaseout of interest rate ceilings on interest.-bearing
accounts, while the latter authorized the money market deposit account.9
9 See the Economic Report of the President for a review of the credit market and
macroeconomic developments in the United States in each of the years represented in the
sample.
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5. CONCLUSION
Tests of the "Life Cycle - Permanent Income Hypothesis" have appeared
in the economic literature with increasing frequency since Hall's work in 1978.
In general, these studies have concluded that a significant proportion of U.S.
consumption behavior does not follow that which 'is implied by the LC-PIH. This
non-optimizing consumption behavior may be due to liquidity constraints
imposed by imperfect loan markets. The magnitude of such non--()ptimizing
behavior by consumers is still a matter of debate. Estimates of the fraction of
total income held by liquidity constrained consumers (A) vary widely, but all of
the previous studies share a common thread in that they treat the value of A as
a constant over the sample period. This study has argued against the
parametric specification of A, rather asserting that A must be specified as
endogenous, determined by other economic, demographic and financial
variables in the economy.
This study has estimated the volatility of the endogenous specification of A
over the 1954:1 - 1985:4 sample period, and found that the movement in At is
statistically significant. Moreover, as measured by the Likelihood Ratio Test,
the endogenous specification of A significantly improves the fit of the estimates
the EV system is statistically supported over the CP system. This has important
implications for economic policymakers, especially with respect to tax policy
changes and other income redistribution programs. The results presented in
this study should serve as a guide for future work on liquidity constrained
consumption behavior~
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DATA APPENDIX
Population Distribution: "Population Estimates" (male and female), U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1948 - 1985 (annual).
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Pan: all ages
PanS: 20 -24 years
Pan6: 25-29 years
Pan7: 30-34 years
Pan9: 40-44 years
Pan10: 45-49 years
Pan11: 50-54 years
An exponential trend was used in order to impute quarterly population estimates
between the annual observations. Once the quarterly population data is formed
from 1946:1 thru 1985:4, the fraction of the total population in each age
category is calculated:
f. _ panj
I - pan' i =5,6,7,9, 10, 11.
where panj is defined above. The age distribution variable used in this study is
, defined as:
Personal Disposable Income: Personal disposable income is obtained from the
National Income Product Accounts (N.I.P.A.) published by the U.S. government.
The data was available quarterly from 1947:1 through 1987:1. It was seasonally
adjusted and expressed in 1982 constant dollars.
Personal Consumption of Nondurables and Services: Nondurable and
service consumption is obtained from the N.I.P.A. and was available from
1947:1 through 1987:1. It was also seasonally adjusted and expressed in 1982
constant dollars.
Delinquency Rate on Installment Loans, 30 days and over: This data was
obtained from the American Bankers Association. It is monthly data available
starting in 1948:1 and is seasonally adjusted. Quarterly observations were
derived from this monthly data by averaging over the three months of each
quarter.
Ratio of Consumer Installment Loans to Personal Income: This is monthly data
starting in 1947:1 and is seasonally adjusted. Quarterly observations were
derived from this monthly data by averaging over the three month of each
quarter.
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APPENDIX A
The power spectra for the filters of the income series reported in Table 1
that are not contained in the main body of the text (Figures 1 - 4) are presented
here. Only the income series is given here, since the consumption series
follows the same pattern.
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Figure A1: Income - No Filter
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Figure A2: Income - Fourth Difference Filter
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Figure A3: Income - Linear Trend Filter
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Figure A4: Income - Quadratic Trend Filter
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Figure AS: Income - Cubic Trend Filter
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